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Tracing its origins to Theobald Wolfe Tone's United 
Irishmen, founded in Belfast on October 18, 1791, Irish 
Republicanism has evolved from its original anti-sectarian, 
Lockean principles as represented by Tone1 to a modern 
movement encompassing national self-determination, anti­
sectarianism, cultural nationalism, radical social policies, 
the politics of electoralism, as well as support for the armed 
struggle dedicated to British withdrawal from Northern Ireland 
and a united Ireland.
Today, the modern Irish Republican movement is best 
represented by the political party Sinn Fein. The party's 
present leadership, headed by its president Gerry Adams, has 
changed the politics and strategies of Sinn Fein and the 
entire Republican movement. Prior to the era of Adams' 
leadership, Sinn Fein's role was primarily a supporter of the 
armed struggle for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. 
Adams and his supporters, chief among them Danny Morrison, 
brought the movement under "radical leadership" (Cronin 4) 
that altered the emphasis from the armed struggle to the 
political struggle, increasing its support among the 
nationalist community of the six counties by non-violent
1Tone' s United Irishmen did not seek total separation 
from England, but only the right to be ruled by an Irish 
parliament that represented the Irish people (Cronin 21). The 
Irish parliament created in 1782, known as Grattan's 
Parliament, represented the Protestant Ascendancy. It  was not 
only unrepresentative (Catholics were excluded), but far from 
independent in that i t  remained under English control.
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protests and electoral politics. Furthermore, the leadership
of the movement increasingly has become more decentralized and
"collective," with participation from the membership a primary
objective of Adams' new strategy.
Sean Cronin, a noted expert on Irish history and
politics, identified five strands of Irish nationalism:
traditionalist is Catholic and often Gaelic; 
constitutional nationalism is influenced, but not 
controlled by the Catholic Church, uses Henry 
Grattan's arguments on Ireland's right to nationhood 
as an independent kingdom, and opposes violence; 
physical-force republicanism refers to Tone and the 
United Irishmen for its justification, but is often 
socially conservative; radical republicanism argues 
that there can be no political change without social 
revolution and stresses the values of the secular 
state; cultural nationalism emphasizes the nation 
and its language rather than the state (3).
Republicanism, therefore, is a theoretical strain of the
broader term Irish nationalism, and Cronin argues that its
radical form, under which the present movement primarily
falls, is the weakest of the five (4) . Cronin attempts to
distinguish between a nationalist and a republican. "An Irish
nationalist is one who wants Ireland ruled by the Irish people
through a representative parliament, the end result of which
must be a nation-state," Cronin contends. "An Irish
Republican, in theory, advocates the kind of republic
envisaged by the United Irishmen, but in practice the term has
come to mean one who seeks to separate Ireland from England by
force" (23) . Cronin's analysis, however, is twelve years old
and so does not include the more recent developments in the
movement since Gerry Adams took the leadership helm upon his
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1983 election as president of Sinn Fein. Adams has expanded 
modern Republicanism by merging elements of a ll five 
categories, thereby increasing its support and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, his emphasis on political education has helped 
clearly define the political platform for the movement. Adams 
also argues that Republicans are the only true nationalists in 
the present-day Irish political arena, either north or south 
of the border.
The modern Irish Republican movement has its origins in 
the dispute over the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that partitioned 
the country, establishing the southern 26 counties as the 
Irish Free State (with dominion status within the United 
Kingdom) and six of Ulster's counties as Northern Ireland 
(Antrim, Derry, Tyrone, Armagh, Down, and Fermanagh). In the 
1918 general election in Ireland, Sinn Fein ran on the sole 
issue of total independence from Britain and won 73 of the 105 
seats, with 36 of the Sinn Fein candidates in prison (Kelley 
35) . Despite this democratic evidence of the desire of the 
Irish people for independence and unity, a desire even the 
British admitted, the Government of Ireland Act (1920), 
referred to as The Partition Act, was passed by the British 
Parliament on December 23, 1920 (Gallagher 138-39). Originally 
opposed by the Protestants in Ulster because they wanted all 
of Ireland to remain under British Rule and had fought 
diligently against Home Rule, the partition carved six of the 
original nine counties of the ancient province to form 
Northern Ireland because Ulster's population ratio between
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Protestants and Catholics was 56/44 percent and Protestants
wanted the larger and "safer" majority of 66 percent (Farrell
24).2 with the three Ulster counties that possessed large
Catholic majorities (Cavan, Donegal, and Monaghan) cut off
from the province, Northern Ireland was a gerrymandered
statelet from its inception, and Irish Nationalists generally
refuse to use the term Ulster to refer to the statelet because
i t  does not adequately reflect the area. Although the
gerrymandered Protestant majority in the Northern Ireland
statelet ostensibly reflects a democratic w ill, i t  should be
noted that the two Ulster counties with small Catholic
majorities (Fermanagh and Tyrone) were forced into the
partition.3 Negotiations in 1921 led to the Anglo-Irish
Treaty, agreed to by the Irish representatives
on the promise given by the British Premier [David 
Lloyd George] and his colleagues that i t  would so 
greatly reduce the partitioned area as to make its 
continued separate existence impossible, and so lead 
to unity (Gallagher 164).
The subsequent debate over ratification in the Dail
produced the dissention that led to the split in the
2In the Treaty negotiations in 1921 with Lloyd George, 
Sinn Fein representative Michael Collins presented figures of 
the religious makeup of the two areas in question: in all nine 
counties of Ulster, there were 890,000 Protestants and 700,000 
Catholics; in the six counties there were 820,570 Protestants 
and 429,161 Catholics (Cronin 271). It can be argued that 
partition coerced not only Catholics, but almost 70,000 
Protestants as well.
3The Boundary Commission provided for in the 1921 Anglo- 
Irish Treaty, the British argued, would be used to incorporate 
areas with nationalist majorities into the Free State. Arthur 
Griffith was one who opposed this idea and demanded a 
plebiscite, but one was never conducted (Cronin 135).
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Republican movement. Those who opposed the Treaty "saw i t  as a 
betrayal of the Republic proclaimed in 1916" and argued that 
Britain would maintain a colonial hold over the entire country 
because of partition (Cronin 29, 144), an argument modern
Republicans continue to maintain. Erskine Childers, Liam 
Mellows, and Cathal Brugha, three of the most prominent anti- 
Treaty Republicans, referenced the long history of British 
broken promises and maintained that the Second Dail4 members 
had no right to sign away Irish freedom and sovereignty 
(Cronin 144-47) . Treaty opponents also claimed that Irish 
signatories signed the document under duress because Lloyd 
George threatened war within three days i f  they refused to 
sign (Cronin 137).
The Treaty's proponents were not against a united 
Ireland. On the contrary, they argued that the Treaty would 
provide the means to obtain that goal. Two of the members of 
the pro-Treaty forces, Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, 
maintained that the Treaty would be a stepping stone to a 
united Ireland and the Republic, and they cited the British 
promise of a Boundary Commission as the means to that end 
(Cronin 150). Many believed that the six counties could not 
stand on their own economically, and therefore the Unionists 
would have no recourse but to join with the 26 counties.
4For an explanation of the First and Second Dail Eireann, 
and any subsequent terms or people not fully explained in the 
text, see the glossary in Appendix B.
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Civil war inevitably broke out in June 1922 and ended May 
1923 with the anti-Treaty forces' cease-fire. The Irish 
Republican Army (I.R.A.), founded in 1919 and, at the time of 
the Civil War, represented the anti-Treaty forces, was poorly 
armed and outmanned, and had no political organization and no 
real plan to defeat the Treaty (Cronin 153) . Those members of 
Sinn Fein who supported the treaty left the party. Eamonn de 
Valera, though opposed to the Treaty during the Civil War, 
broke with Sinn Fein and founded Fianna Fail in 1926 in order 
to become a member of the Dail. He became the Free State's 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in 1932 and the President of the 
Republic of Ireland in 1959.
The Republican forces regrouped after the Civil War and 
began in the late 1930s to concentrate their energies on 
guerrilla tactics against the British to end partition. Sinn 
Fein, weak after the war, was taken over by the I.R.A. and 
used as its political arm. Though much under the control of 
the I.R.A. at this time, the party was "not just a front" for 
the armed struggle, Cronin asserts; i t  was s t i l l  "very 
conservative and careful of its 'national image'" (169). The 
role of the party during the I.R.A.'s campaigns of 1939-40, 
1942-44, and 1956-62 was largely one of support for the armed 
struggle; but with the advent of the Northern Ireland c iv il 
rights movement in the late 1960s, Sinn Fein became more 
politically active and much less m ilitaristic.
Arthur Griffith, the party's primary founder, established 
the movement that was to become in 1905 Sinn Fein, and its
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roots were not Republican. A Protestant woman offered the name 
Sinn Fein (Cronin 99), which has been translated as "ourselves 
alone" or "we ourselves," and was applied to emphasize its aim 
of political, economic, and cultural independence. Griffith 
founded the party on capitalist principles of economic self- 
reliance, and i t  advocated a restoration of an independent 
Irish parliament (Jackson 368) . It was not until after the 
Easter 1916 Rising that Sinn Fein became a true Republican 
party, and at that time i t  was a form of physical-force 
republicanism.
The 1960s saw the Republicans split again, this time on 
the issue of reform of the Northern Ireland statelet, the role 
of the armed struggle, and le ftis t ideology. In 1969, the 
I.R.A. split into the Officials, who maintained that Northern 
Ireland could be reformed through political means alone, and 
the Provisionals, who argued the traditional republican line 
of historical British intransigence and deception and the 
necessity for the armed struggle to end partition, and thus 
destroy the statelet. In 1970, Sinn Fein split along these 
same lines. Adams, along with others who took the Provisional 
side in the debate, maintained that the Republican movement 
neglected to defend its community from the attacks by 
loyalists and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.). in the 
riots squelching the c iv il rights movement. The Officials (its 
political party is now called The Workers Party) are Marxist 
in ideology and have maintained a stance of opposition to the 
armed struggle since its August 1971 cease-fire (Farrell 355).
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The Provisionals, sometimes referred to as the Provos, 
in itia lly  held a very traditionalist and socially conservative 
stand (Farrell 270). Today, the Provisional prefix has been 
dropped, and all references in this work to the I.R.A. and 
Sinn Fein w ill refer to the Provisional wing.
After the split, the Republicans (Provisionals) set their 
sights on British withdrawal, amnesty for political prisoners, 
and the abolition of the Unionist-controlled Stormont 
government (Cronin 2 05) . They were determined to show Britain 
that the statelet could not govern without the nationalist 
community's involvement and that Britain must face 
responsibility for the six county statelet and its injustice. 
Their efforts succeeded, and on March 24, 1972, the Stormont
government was suspended. The British government's attempt to 
replace i t  with an Assembly and an executive formed from the 
Assembly members failed. Today, the British government
maintains direct rule of Northern Ireland.
The number one priority of today's Republican movement 
takes i t  roots directly from its anti-Treaty stance: the fight 
against partition and the removal of the British from the six 
counties that constitute Northern Ireland, the prerequisite 
for a united Ireland. The 1916 Proclamation,5 which proclaimed 
an independent Irish Republic for all of Ireland, continues to 
be both its rhetorical and political basis. The challenge to 
Sinn Fein and its leadership has been to develop a political
5See the text of the Proclamation in Appendix C.
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organization that builds on the fundamental philosophy of the 
movement and creates a viable strategy to obtain both its 
objectives and community support. Adams has recognized this 
necessity: "Political leadership involves defining the
political objective and providing the political guidance on 
how to achieve that objective" (Pathway 69).
Gerry Adams joined Sinn Fein in 1964, while the 
leadership in Dublin was advocating increased political 
activity at the expense of the armed struggle and the national 
question (Keena 26-27). When the movement split in 1969/70, 
Adams joined the Provisionals and proceeded to become a 
leading public figure of the movement and increasingly an 
important political strategist for i t .  In 1977 and 1978, the 
Republicans began a reappraisal of their strategies, and 
Adams’ ideas greatly influenced the outcome, which set its 
goal as a relevant 32-county political party with a solid 
support base. He was active in the movement to support the 
hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981, and encouraged the electoral 
intervention in the Westminster elections of 1981. Adams 
became President of Sinn Fein at the party's Ard Fheis6 in 
1983, a position he maintains today, and was elected MP for 
West Belfast in the same year.
Adams' leadership of Sinn Fein has clearly been 
revolutionary. He helped end the abstentionist policy from 
Leinster House, the Dublin parliament, in 1986; persuaded the
6National conference.
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membership to accept electoralism as a valid tactic for the 
Republican movement; encouraged an all-Ireland struggle; and 
has continued efforts to develop a strong political 
organization with a collective leadership. He has transformed 
Sinn Fein from a semi-organized support group of the I.R.A. 
into a growing force in nationalist politics, focusing on 
broad-based issues as well as the military efforts for 
independence, and aimed toward a 32-county party that 
participates in the wide spectrum of electoral politics. Adams 
played, and continues to play as president, a critical role in 
the maturation and direction of Sinn Fein and, consequently, 
the entire Republican movement. In essence, Adams is the 
primary force moving the Republicans into the 21st Century.
Gerry Adams, a self-educated political activist and 
theorist, has written five book-length works that delve into 
his political philosophy, four of which are included in this 
study. The fifth  book, The Street and Other Stories (1992), is 
a collection of short stories centered on the people of the 
six counties and how the "Troubles" affect their lives. These 
works outline the psychological, cultural, social, and 
political foundations of Adams' political philosophy. A study 
of his works is essential to understanding the modern 
Republican movement and predicting its future direction. 
Though the argument may be advanced that because Gerry Adams 
and Sinn Fein support the armed struggle of the I.R.A. then 
Adams' works are unworthy of study, such a contention is 
absurd. No political scientist or historian would dream of
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applying that logic to Thomas Jefferson, who promoted and
supported armed nationalist rebellion against the British
colonialism of his era.7 As Sean MacDonagh, publisher of
Adams' The Politics of Irish Freedom, points out:
The viewpoint that Sinn Fein should be as free to 
express its politics as any other party does not 
depend on agreement with Sinn Fein or the IRA. . . .
The publication of this book . . . may . . . promote
and increase knowledge and understanding, and these 
are valuable commodities irrespective of any degree 
of sympathy or antipathy. Whatever one's opinion of 
it ,  the republican movement possesses a definable 
ideology, identifiable policies and a sense of 
political strategy, all of which are expressed by 
Gerry Adams (xv).
Sean Cronin described the "thinkers" behind Irish 
nationalism - Theobald Wolfe Tone, Arthur Griffith, Padraig 
Pearse, James Connolly -- as "fashioning an ideology of 
struggle" (26-27). In that same manner, Gerry Adams is re­
fashioning the ideology of the Republican movement for the 
modern era.
7Not only were Irish nationalists influenced by the 
American revolutionaries, Ireland's sons played a key role in 
America's War of Independence. In addition to a large number 
of Irish emigrants in America (a 1790 Census estimated that 10 
percent were of Irish extraction), there were a number of 
notable Irish-American officers in the army. This fact did not 
escape the notice of the British, one of whom noted in 




Birth of an Irish Republican:
F a lls  Memories
Falls Memories, originally published in 1982 and Gerry 
Adams' firs t published book-length work, begins the journey of 
a working-class, Belfast boy into political maturation and 
leadership. An interweaving of history, Belfast street songs 
and poems, and Adams' own childhood stories, the book
demonstrates the psychological, political, and social 
circumstances that came to bear upon Adams and other 
Republicans and that define the working class of which he is a 
part and from which Sinn Fein draws most of its present 
support. This work subtly delves into Adams' political ideas 
and also provides a framework from which the reader can 
understand both his early political education as a child and 
teenager and the political philosophy he has articulated as an 
adult.
Adams opens Falls Memories with a collection of his 
childhood memories. These recollections not only serve 
autobiographical purposes; they also provide a sort of 
working-class Northern Ireland Catholic Everyman's childhood 
biography. Much of the book is Adams' fairly detailed 
historical analysis, from the Republican perspective, of 
Belfast and its surrounding area. Falls Memories, therefore, 
is Adams' attempt not only to relate his childhood, but also 
to chronicle the Falls Road neighborhood before much of i t  was 
devastated in the riots squelching the c iv il rights movement
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of the 1960s, an event Adams calls "the passing of a 
community" (Falls 5).
Gerry Adams, born 6 October 1948 to a family of Irish 
Republicans, spent his childhood in the relative calm in 
Northern Ireland of the 1950s and early 1960s. Along with the 
typical mischievous trouble that he and his boyhood friends 
got into, such as sneaking into a movie theater, Adams also 
recalls the more subtly political events: “whispers about 'the 
boys' or an occasional witness to meetings of pale-faced 
earnest young men, who, we gathered disinterestedly, had just 
'got out.'" As youngsters, Adams and his cohorts are not only 
chased by the local watchman but "later s t i l l,  but with less 
glee, pursued by R.U.C. riot squads and, later again, by the 
British Army" (Falls 4). More memories surface, including 
stories of I.R.A. volunteers: a young female volunteer "her 
face streaming with tears and her body wracked with sobs as 
she tried to exact vengeance [for the death of a friend] on a 
hovering helicopter with an aged .303 rifle  which was too big 
for her to shoulder properly" (Falls 5). This particular 
passage passionately illustrates the dogged determination of 
the Irish people to fight what they see as British oppression, 
no matter how arduous and seemingly futile that fight may be.
After this brief introduction, Adams shifts from the 
personal to the historical and delves into his examination of 
the province of Ulster, beginning with the ancient history of 
the area and continuing through the early twentieth century. 
His purpose for this history is two-fold: firs t, to show why
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the province developed as i t  did and why the English 
considered i t  the most d ifficu lt province to conquer and thus 
had to implant i t  with Scottish Presbyterians; and second, 
through the use of historical accounts, to reveal the nature 
of English rule as tyrannical and genocidal.
Adams takes great pride in the ancient history of the 
area, stressing both its Celtic culture and the 
interconnection between i t  and the Republican movement. In 
1795, for example, Protestants Theobald Wolfe Tone and Henry 
Joy McCracken, leaders of the United Irishmen, selected a fort 
overlooking Belfast and built in the 5th Century BC, an 
important era of Celtic civilization, "to swear themselves to 
the struggle for Irish independence," (Falls 8) an act that 
inevitably and eventually led to the doomed rebellion of 1798 
and both leaders' deaths in that same year.
The difficulty in conquering Ulster can be seen in the 
history of the castle in Belfast built by John de Courcy, who 
was "granted" the province by the English in 1177. In 1333, 
the castle, after numerous battles between the native Irish 
and the Anglo-Normans and Scots, was firmly established in 
Irish hands until the 1550s. In that era, the castle was twice 
"granted" to the O'Neill clan in agreements with the English 
monarch. But both times these agreements were ignored, and the 
English took control of the castle and the surrounding lands, 
primarily to develop the timber industry (Falls 9).
One of the most moving stories in this history, and one 
that Adams relates because i t  epitomizes English rule and
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displays English promises as deceitful, is that of the 
massacre of Brian MacPhelim O'Neill and his family by the Earl 
of Essex in 1573. Adams quotes the Four Masters, who describe 
the scene of a feast in Belfast castle hosted by O'Neill in 
celebration of cessation of hostilities and an agreement to 
develop the town.
'At the expiration of this time, when they were 
agreeably drinking and making merry, Brian, his 
brother, and his wife were seized upon by the Earl, 
and all his people put unsparingly to the sword -- 
men, women, youths and maidens -- in Brian's own 
presence. Brian was afterwards sent to Dublin, 
together with his wife and brother, where they were 
cut in quarters. Such was the end of their feast.
This unexpected massacre; this wicked and 
treacherous murder of the lord of the race of Hugh 
Boy O'Neill, the head and senior of the race of 
Eoghan, son of Niall of the Nine Hostages, and of 
a ll the Gaels, was a sufficient cause of hatred, of 
the English to the Irish' (Falls 12).
Essex and his massacre of the O'Neill family are by no 
means anomalies in the history of British rule of Ulster. Sir 
Arthur Chichester, a robber of English tax collectors prior to 
going to Ireland, along with Lord Mountjoy were Queen 
Elizabeth I's  instruments by which her policy of extermination 
of the native Irish was carried out. Adams deftly cites 
Chichester's own words to display the "ruthlessness and 
obvious relish," (Falls 13) he and Mountjoy enjoyed in this 
process:
I burned all along the lough within four miles of 
Dungannon and killed 100 people, sparing none 
whatever quality, age or sex, soever besides many 
burned to death. We k i l l  man, woman and child, 
horse, beast and whatsoever we find (Falls 13).
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After the Flight of the Earls in 1607, the plantation of
the province continued full-force, with more Scotsmen and
Manxmen joining the English planters. The "native or Gaelic
Irish were forbidden to live within town or city walls,"
(Falls 15), thus those Catholic families settled to the west
of the city, where most remain today.
Nineteenth and twentieth century Belfast history provides
many lessons for Irish Republicans, and Adams incorporates
street songs and poems into his historical analysis of these
eras as a unique method of communicating the nature of
working-class life  in Belfast. For instance, "The Linen Slaves
of Belfast," which describes the deplorable conditions of the
workers in the linen mills in the early 19th century, opens
with this Belfast millsong:
There goes that bloody whistle
And you never get a stand
Sure you'd be better off in the Union
Or in MacNamara's Band (Falls 33).
From the 1830s to the 1850s, large numbers of rural 
Irish, most Catholics, settled Belfast and worked in the 
growing linen industry. Most of the workers in the mill were 
women and children, and by the early 20th century, there were 
numerous harsh rules enacted by the linen companies that 
severely restricted the workers. Adams points to the horrid 
working conditions in the mills as evidence of yet another 
slavery (besides that of British imperialism) of the working 
class. The minimum wage workday was 6:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on 
weekdays, and 6:30 to noon on Saturdays. The workers received
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two breaks, breakfast at 8:00 a.m. and lunch at 1:00 p.m.
(Falls 28). Adams' description of the environment for these
women and children in the mills is vivid:
In the spinning rooms the uncomfortably hot air was 
kept damp to prevent the fine linen thread from 
breaking, and in the earlier stages of the process 
the very air in the carding or spinning rooms was 
thick with fine 'pouce' or dust which came from the 
raw flax. The millworkers and especially the 
doffers, who worked barefooted, inhaled this pouce 
and serious bronchial illness was common (Falls 29).
The workers, due in part to these harsh conditions and in part
to insufficient nutrition, suffered from a variety of medical
problems, including premature births, tuberculosis, and
susceptibility to numerous outbreaks of disease, such as
typhoid (Falls 29-30) .
The severe rules placed on the mill workers were 
numerous. A day's pay was lost i f  the worker was late (Falls 
30), singing and laughing were prohibited by a 1911 rule, and 
fines and dismissal were possible punishments i f  a worker 
combed her hair or brought to work a newspaper or knitting 
needles (Falls 33) .
The labor movements led by two individuals in the early 
twentieth century are declared by Adams as important
milestones in the history of the Belfast working class. In 
1907, James Larkin began organizing the Belfast dock workers 
in an effort to obtain better pay and to create a union for 
these and similar workers (Falls 31), and in 1909 he 
established the Irish Transport and General Workers Union 
(ITGWU) that was to play a crucial role in worker unrest in
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Dublin (Boyce, 300, 305), and whose Citizen Army participated
in the Easter 1916 Rising (Jackson 378, Farrell 354).
It  is partly from Larkin's labor efforts in Belfast that 
Adams draws an anti-sectarian and le ftis t bent. Larkin unified 
both Protestant and Catholic workers in this labor agitation 
and eventual strike. Seen as dangerous by the employers, this 
unity was greeted by fierce and violent opposition by both the 
Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) and the British Army. After 
the strike began, efforts by the establishment to divide the 
workers intensified. Unionists politicians and the press tried 
in vain to prevent Protestant workers from joining Larkin, who 
was publicly censured as "a socialist and a Catholic" (Falls 
31) . A number of British troops were eventually stationed in 
the Falls Road area, even though the strike was not taking 
place there. On August 12, 1907, these troops, after several
demonstrations and clashes, killed two people when they fired 
into a Catholic crowd gathered on the Grosvenor Road. 
Eventually the strike was ended with pay raises guaranteed to 
the workers. Adams' assessment of this labor agitation and its 
historical alliance of Protestants and Catholics stressed the 
ability of the two communities to unite in causes that clearly 
affected both and the inevitable difficulty in sustaining that 
unity: " . .  . i t  showed very clearly what could be achieved i f
a permanent unity could be forged; but i t  was also clear how 
remote, given the influence of Orangeism, such a development 
really was within a society dominated by the Orange 
ascendancy" (Falls 32).
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The second labor leader portrayed, James Connolly, is a 
man about whom Adams was to learn more when imprisoned in Long 
Kesh. Though probably most famous for his role in the Easter 
1916 Rising, Connolly is cited here only for his labor efforts 
for the Belfast linen workers. After joining Larkin's ITGWU 
(which he would eventually lead), he set his sights on 
organizing the linen workers in 1911. Connolly was infuriated 
by the conditions of the women and children in the mills, and 
he publicized their plight and called for action in the labor 
publication the Irish Worker:
The whole atmosphere of the mill is an atmosphere of 
slavery. The workers are harassed by petty bosses, 
mulcted in fines for the most tr iv ia l offences and 
robbed and cheated in a systematic manner.
Imagine a spinning room so hot with a moist heat
that the girls and women must work in bare feet,
with dress open at the breast and arms, hair tied up 
to prevent i t  irritating the skin . . . imagine the
stifling, suffocating atmosphere that in a few 
months banishes the colour from the cheeks of the
rosiest half-timer1 and reduces all to one common
deathly palor (Falls 34).
Connolly led about 3000 linen workers on strike, mainly over
the wretched working conditions, even though the labor union,
of which about nine percent of the total workforce were
members, refused to support the strike, and thus, to pay them
strike pay (Falls 36) . Because the mills were largely
unaffected due to a glut in the linen market, Connolly
encouraged a "stay-in strike," whereby the workers would join
together when one  was disciplined unfairly (Falls 37-38) . 
1
1Children who alternated between work in the mills and 
attending school.
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Though the strike failed, some women joined the section of the 
ITGWU specifically for the textile workers, and i t  became a 
base upon which Connolly would draw in later labor agitations.
One of Adams' primary concerns is the lack of Belfast 
childrens' awareness of this history:
Not for nothing did we read l i t t le  of such 
occurrences in our school history books. We passed 
the mills every day, knowing l i t t le  of the slavery 
upon which they prospered. Instead we read about or 
were lectured upon the shrewd business sense of the 
unionist landowning and manufacturing class and of 
how they built up the North's textile industry. Yet 
the people whose sweated bodies they sapped live all 
around us (Falls 39).
Education, therefore, is an essential part of economic, 
social, and political awareness and maturation for Adams and 
his vision of Irish Republicans, a theme to which he returns 
in later books. The history of educational efforts in the 
Falls area demonstrates one aspect of the unequal status and 
conditions under which the Catholic population lives. In the 
late 1800s, three times as many Catholics as Protestants were 
considered illiterate , and most, Adams asserts, lived in the 
Falls (Falls 57) . The situation only began to improve when 
Catholic-run schools, particularly the Christian Brothers' 
schools begun in 1866, were set up as a response to the 
allegations of proselytization of Catholic children by the 
Protestant teachers in the "ragged schools." Though not 
explicitly stated, Adams implies that the Catholic Church only 
came to the aid of the Falls children when i t  feared
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conversion from Catholicism was imminent, a subtle example of 
the Catholic Church's failure to support its worshippers.
Though he and his friends were not taught in school much 
of the history of Belfast that he recalls in Falls Memories. 
Adams did learn first-hand about the harsh realities of 
working-class Catholic life  in Belfast. Sectarianism played a 
role even in the lives of young children. Adams' firs t memory 
of encountering sectarianism was of being cornered by three 
boys who forced him to prove he was not a Protestant. Saying 
the Hail Mary and, eventually, paying them the l i t t le  money 
and candy he had with him, satisfied the group. But the event 
impressed upon Adams that sectarianism, "had nothing to do 
with religion and was merely, as always, a profitable ruse" 
(Falls 109). Later, as a young man, he was admittedly 
surprised when he was turned down for a job because, as the 
Orangeman owner put it ,  "'we don't employ your sort here. 
Cudn' t do it .  You dig with the wrong fu t'" (Falls 114). Though 
this rejection might have been startling, Adams knew he was 
not the firs t nor would he be the last to encounter such 
discrimination; its long-standing roots originated in the 
province's plantation and continued into the establishment of 
the statelet. Sir Basil Brooke, a Unionist prime minister of 
the Stormont parliament, once boasted proudly and publicly of 
his discriminatory policies: he condemned "Protestants and 
Orangemen who employ Roman Catholics. I feel I can speak 
freely on this subject as I have not a Roman Catholic about my 
place. I recommend those people who are loyalists not to
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employ Roman Catholics, ninety-five percent of whom are 
disloyal" (Falls 75).
As a teenager, Adams worked at a West Belfast pub that 
was situated on the border of the two communities, and its 
patrons were primarily working class Protestants from the 
Shankill with a few Catholics (Falls 114) . During this time, 
Adams was beginning to become politically active in the 
housing agitations, but his politics did not prevent a 
camaraderie, though shallow, with the bar's patrons. A popular 
poem of the day, written by Robert Calvert, was a favorite of 
a ll of the bar's patrons and showed the Irish sense of humor 
that both Protestants and Catholics share:
In a mean abode on the Shankill Road lived a man 
named Billy Bloat
He had a wife, the curse of his life , who continually 
got his goat
So one day, at dawn, with her nightdress on, he cut 
her bloody throat.
With razor gash he settled her hash, oh, never was 
crime so quick
But the drip, drip, drip on the pillowslip of her 
lifeblood made him sick
And the pool of gore on the bedroom floor grew 
clotted and cold and thick.
And yet he was glad he had done what he had when 
she lay there s tiff  and s t i l l
But a sudden awe of the angry law struck his heart 
with an icy chill
So to finish the fun so well begun he resolved 
himself to k il l.
He took the sheet from his wife's coul' feet and 
twisted i t  into a rope
And he hanged himself from the pantry shelf, ' twas 
an easy end, let's hope
For in the face of death with his last dying breath he 
solemnly cursed the Pope.
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But the strangest turn to the whole concern is only 
just beginning,
He went to Hell but his wife got well and she's s t i l l  
alive and sinning,
For the razorblade was German made but the sheet 
was Belfast linen. (Falls 114-15)
The poem also reflects Irish nationalism of the 18th century
and the political arguments of Theobald Wolfe Tone and his
United Irishmen. Protestant (Presbyterian and Anglican)
merchants and manufacturers and the Catholic middle class
formed the backbone of a movement designed to reform the Irish
parliament and break England's economic power over Ireland.
One foreign competitor of Irish linen was German linen, and
Tone lamented the English royal family's preference for the
lesser quality German linen (Cronin 49).
It  was during one of the rowdy St. Patrick's Day nights 
that one of the Protestant patrons "whispered to me with a 
friendly and knowing wink, 'Y'know, we're a ll Paddys beneath 
the skin.' He took another meditative slug from his Guiness 
and continued: 'I f  youse fenians would just catch yourselves 
on and stay quiet, everything would be okay'" (Falls 115). To 
Adams, this single declaration sums up the problem between the 
two communities. While the Protestants are, indeed, as Irish 
as the Catholics (though some refuse to admit it ) ,  the 
Catholic population is treated as second class citizens who 
are viewed as disloyal troublemakers.
A devout Catholic, Adams does not condone sectarianism of 
any kind, and, in fact, stresses that anti-sectarianism is a 
founding principle of Irish Republicanism. In his description 
of the early churches, both Catholic and Protestant, built in
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Belfast, Adams makes a point of acknowledging the Protestant 
contribution of funds for the construction of St. Peter's 
Catholic church (Falls 24) . Furthermore, in the heart of the 
Protestant section of West Belfast, there are four streets, 
Blaney, Loftus, Brenna, and Meenan streets, named after 
Catholic priests who helped nurse cholera victims in the area 
(Falls 42).
Even more important is the role of Protestants in the 
Irish Republican movement itse lf. In an old man's first-person 
account of the "Troubles" in the 1920s, Adams subtly stresses 
the non-religious foundation upon which Irish Republicanism 
was born. The United Irishmen, founded by Protestant barrister 
Theobald Wolfe Tone and consisting mostly of Presbyterians 
[none of the 28 founding members were Catholic (Cronin 47)], 
and considered the ancestor of the contemporary Republican 
movement, had its beginnings in Belfast in 1791. And, Adams' 
old man points out, a monument, now destroyed, erected in the 
Milltown cemetary commemorated over twenty Protestant Fenians: 
"that's a contradiction, people would say nowadays: ignorance 
is a great man . . . " (Falls 64) . It is from Tone and the 
United Irishmen that the Irish Republican movement acquires 
this anti-sectarianism. The organization's constitution, drawn 
in large part from John Locke's social contract theory, calls 
for "a brotherhood of affection, a communion of rights, and an 
Union of power among Irishmen of every re lig ious persuasion; 
and thereby to obtain a complete reform in the Legislature,
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founded on the principles of civil, political, and religious 
liberty" (Cronin 23; emphasis mine).
Though Irish Republicanism sprang from the United 
Irishmen, the modern movement, as represented by Sinn Fein, 
includes more elements than Tone and his organization 
expressed. One important theme Adams repeatedly emphasizes in 
his books is that Celtic culture is the nucleus of the 
nationalist movement. Though Tone declared that his league's 
objective was "to substitute the common name Irishman for the 
names Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter, " that aim did not 
include the revitalization of the Irish language, the teaching 
of Irish history, or the celebrating of Irish cultural events 
(Cronin 47). Today, however, Irish Republicanism places great 
emphasis on the importance of both the Gaelic language and 
Irish cultural heritage. Throughout Falls Memories, Adams 
informs the reader that numerous place names are corruptions 
of the Irish Gaelic. His hometown, Belfast, is from the Irish 
Beal Feirste, which translates to "the mouth of the ford of 
the sand banks" (Falls 19) . Tuath na bhFal, "district of the 
high hedges" is the present Falls Road area, while Bothar na 
bhFal is the Falls Road, or "road of the high hedges" (Falls 
18,19). Many more towns have Irish ancestry: Ballydownfine is 
from the Irish Baile Dun Fionn, meaning "the townland of the 
white fort;" Clandeboye is from Clann Aoidh Bui; and Rathmore 
(near Antrim) was originally Rath Mor Muigh Line (Falls
15,9,8).
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In his historical analysis, Adams includes the rise of a 
number of Gaelic organizations that were to become crucial in 
the development of Irish Republicanism. The firs t Gaelic 
League, founded in 1893, was a non-political and non-sectarian 
organization originally devoted only to the revitalization of 
Irish Gaelic, but eventually broadened to include other 
elements of Gaelic culture such as music and the arts (Falls 
46, Jackson 365) . Padraig Pearse, one of the leaders of the 
1916 Easter Rising, claimed i t  paved the way for the Rising 
(Cronin 3). The Gaelic Magazine was established in 1795, and 
the Ulster Gaelic Society was begun in 1835 (Falls 46) . As a 
result of the increasingly Catholic presence in these Gaelic 
organizations by the turn of the 19th century, a Protestant 
National Association was founded to encourage Protestant 
participation in the Gaelic and national struggles (Falls 50). 
These organizations are not only important due to their 
efforts in the cultural realm, but also because modern Sinn 
Fein developed from them.
Adams traces the early development of the Republican 
movement and emphasizes the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(I.R.B.), the precursor to the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.), 
after the turn of the 19th century. Denis McCullough, Bulmer 
Hobson, Sean Mac Diarmada, and Arthur Griffith a ll play 
leading roles in the birth of the modern Republican movement 
and Sinn Fein (Falls 50-51) . In this discussion, Adams makes 
his firs t mention of Sinn Fein in an electoral situation by 
stressing that the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by John
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Redmond, "was routed by Sinn Fein" in 1918 (Falls 52). He also
notes that an unfair distinction in press coverage of the
election was even then being made between Sinn Fein's
candidates and those of the I.P.P.:
The Irish News coverage of the election makes 
interesting reading, for that paper appears to have 
acted as an election periodical for the Irish 
Parliamentary Party. Nowhere in its coverage of the 
election in the Falls Division [where Eamon de 
Valera ran as the Sinn Fein candidate against the 
I.P.P. candidate Joe Devlin] was one republican 
statement, speech or election manifesto reported and 
reporting of republican election activity was 
minimal. Exposure of Joe Devlin went to the other 
extreme, and pages were filled with details of his 
sponsors, expansive reports of his meetings, a 
parade, election addresses and statements (Falls 
54) .
This censorship, though self-inflicted in this instance, was 
to continue in the North and South of Ireland to the present 
day, with governmental restrictions forced on parties' 
candidates, the press, and the voters themselves enacted as 
recently as 1985 (Knox 453-454) .
Gerry Adams' political convictions arise not only from 
historical and political sources, but also from personal 
experience and the experiences of his family. Even though his 
childhood was somewhat sheltered from the political turmoil of 
the North, his family tradition was firmly entrenched in the 
Republican movement. His mother's family, the Hannaways, were 
well-known and well-respected in Republican circles (Keena 
23). His father's family's involvement in the movement began 
with his grandfather (Falls 62). Adams' father was a member of 
the I.R.A., and was later imprisoned, as were many other
28
relatives, in Long Kesh (Keena 23). The Royal Ulster 
Constabulary's harassment and violence that Adams describes in 
Falls Memories are known to his family through personal 
experience. As a youngster, Paddy Adams, Gerry's father, was 
shot by the R.U.C. and "seriously injured" (Falls 74). I t  is 
important, however, to note that Adams does not concentrate on 
his personal life  so much as he does the lives of average, 
working-class Belfast citizens. Though he mentions his 
father's injury, i t  is only in passing, and Adams ensures he 
does not become the center of the analysis at hand. For 
instance, he underlines the fact that these were not the firs t 
cases of R.U.C. harassment of the nationalist community by 
citing a song that was popular prior to the Troubles in the 
1940s:
I'm a decent wee girl, Maggie Walsh is my name 
I was born in the Loney, the Falls Road, the same 
Sure I went over by M illfield and the peelers were 
there
They put their hand on my shoulder and then called 
a car.
I t  was early next morning about ten o'clock 
Before Judge McCarthy I was placed in the dock 
He put on his eyeglass and to me he did say 
'Is i t  you Maggie Walsh, that's before me this 
day?
If i t  had been your firs t time sure you might have 
gone free
But this is your third time on the book, I can see 
One month, I ' l l  give you, you'll be out off the 
way
For shouting "Home Rule" on St Patrick's Day!'
Sure the warder comes in and he opens your cell 
'Roll up your oul blankets and empty your poe 
And right about turn to the bone yard you go.'
(Falls 74-75)
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Raids by the R.U.C. and the British Army were not new to 
the Falls Road area (Adams cites a newspaper article from 1797 
that describes one), but Adams' firs t such experience came 
when he was sixteen. In 1964, the Sinn Fein election office on 
Divis Street displayed a tricolor flag, which Ian Paisley, the 
now famous Unionist politician, threatened to tear down. 
"Further encouragement was supplied by the R.U.C. who sledge- 
hammered their way into the premises and seized the flag"
(Falls 132). Though replaced the next day, riots followed. 
From these events Adams and some of his friends learned that, 
though they were mere spectators, the R.U.C. made no 
distinction between active participants in the riots and 
inactive ones. "Some of us learned quickly that i t  was as well 
to be hanged for a stone as a stare," and this experience gave 
him his firs t impetus into political activity (Falls 133).
Gerry Adams' Falls Memories is not meant to be a 
political work, in the traditional sense, but instead, as he 
calls it ,  "a book about what i t  was like here . . . right from 
the very beginnings" (Falls 6). Just as no Irish literature is 
divorced from Irish politics, neither is a chronicle of a 
Belfast neighborhood and its inhabitants. For Adams, this 
chronicle reveals some important political ideas that underlie 
and guide his later policies as president of Sinn Fein.
The history of the province of Ulster and the city of 
Belfast provides its residents not only with a great sense of 
pride but i t  also emphasizes the tyrannical nature of British 
imperial rule and the incompatibility of that rule with the
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notion of freedom for any of Ireland's citizens. The lessons 
learned from the labor struggles in the 19th and 20th 
centuries prove not only that Irish Protestant and Catholic 
workers can forge a united bond, but that they m u s t i f  they 
are to break the yoke of oppression. Protestants, Adams 
declares, have already played an important role in the 
Republican movement, and he w ill later stress the need to 
include them in the future of a united Ireland as well.
From these historical arguments, i t  follows logically 
that education is an essential prerequisite for an Irish 
Republican, because without it ,  neither he nor the people from 
whom he desires support can understand the nature of the 
nationalist struggle. The loss of the Irish language also 
becomes central to Adams' concept of nationalism. A people's 
language and culture are inextricably linked, and the 
revitalization of Irish, therefore, necessarily aids the 
revitalization of the Irish culture. Early Irish cultural and 
nationalist organizations such as The Gaelic League were 
essential to the development of modern Irish Republicanism.
Electoral politics are also discussed in Falls Memories, 
though Adams does not examine their role in the movement. The 
Sinn Fein triumph in the 1918 elections, the deliberate lack 
of reporting of its candidate, and the R.U.C.'s destruction of 
the party's tricolor flag and, hence, the attempted 
destruction of the party and its supporters in 1964, all 
impressed upon Adams both the difficulty in engendering 
support for the movement and the necessity of succeeding in
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that effort. The 1964 election in which he began participation 
was, Adams concluded, "geared more to canvassing recruits than 
votes and in that i t  undoubtedly succeeded" (Falls 133). Gerry 
Adams would begin to cultivate and expand these ideas in his 
early days of involvement in the Republican movement, most 
specifically while in prison in Long Kesh.
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Chapter II
Reflection and Maturation: Cage Eleven
While Falls Memories chronicles Gerry Adams' Belfast 
childhood, depicting a young man becoming politically aware, 
Cage Eleven completes the process of political education and 
maturation as a new leader refines his political theories. The 
issues in this book are broad and are not intended to be 
covered in depth. While imprisoned in Long Kesh, Adams began a 
process of reflection upon the Republican movement, its 
strategies, and its future. Cage Eleven reflects some of the 
themes on which he concentrated: prison issues, in particular 
torture and conditions for Republican prisoners in jails in 
both Northern Ireland and England; political education for the 
Republican activist; the role of the Catholic Church in the 
statelet; and the role of armed conflict and its relationship 
to the overall Republican movement.
Though the British, without offering proof, allege he was 
an I.R.A. member and even Chief of Staff in the 1970s, Adams 
denies the allegations (Keena 7). In March 1972 he was 
interned without tr ia l on the Maidstone prison ship (Cage 12). 
His arrest and subsequent interrogation and torture were 
experiences on which Adams would draw in his written 
descriptions of prison conditions and his appeals for change.
After a food strike that he enthusiastically helped lead 
brought the end of the prison ship, Adams was transferred to 
Long Kesh. It  is there from 1975 to 1977 that Adams wrote his
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Brownie articles, named for the psuedonym under which most 
were published in Republican News. Most of the chapters of 
Cage Eleven, published in 1990, are originally Brownie 
articles. These selections are a mixture of stories of life  in 
the prison and Adams' personal statements on various political 
ideas and events in Irish political history.
Adams writes intriguing and captivating descriptions, 
most in a fictional format, of life  as a Republican prisoner. 
Stressing that his family is "by no means unique" (Cage 12), 
Adams relates that his father, his uncle, and his brothers all 
spent time in Long Kesh (Cage 11). The Long Kesh prisoners are 
not merely names; they are relatives, friends, and loved ones 
of most members of the nationalist community in Northern 
Ireland.
Adams' prison experiences began in March 1972 when he was 
picked up by the R.U.C. and interned without tr ia l or charge. 
He endured repeated brutal beatings during the 36 hour 
interrogation by R.U.C. officers. Sleep deprivation and 
threats were also used to coerce Adams into answering their 
questions. At the end of 36 hours, he admitted his name, but 
refused the other demands for information, and after 48 hours 
he was moved from the Palace Barracks to the Maidstone (Keena 
10-11) . He was released from Long Kesh a few months after the 
transfer to aid in secret truce talks between the I.R.A. and 
British government officials. Adams' second arrest, in July 
1973, was also followed by torture, this time by members of 
the British Army (Keena 56) . His kidneys and genitals were
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hit, the backs of his hands were burned by cigarettes, and he 
was beaten unconscious several times during the session. At 
one point in the beating, an army doctor examined Adams and 
announced him f i t  enough for continued interrogation; the 
torture began again. As a result, Adams suffered irreversible 
kidney damage (Keena 57).
The prisoners on the Maidstone also told horrendous tales 
of torture. One man had been hung by his thumbs, with his toes 
barely touching the floor, while his stomach was jabbed 
repeatedly until the blood vessels around his navel burst. 
Others had their genitals squeezed and kicked, while some 
prisoners were given "truth drugs" (Keena 12) . These stories 
confirmed Adams' belief that his torture had not been an 
aberration because of his growing position of influence in the 
Republican movement; rather, such practices are inherent in 
the Northern Ireland system.
Neither did the harassment and beatings end after the 
in itia l interrogation of the prisoners. The British Army 
soldiers often raided the cages in Long Kesh, and the guards, 
or screws as they are commonly called, even took to stealing 
the prisoners' legal property, like the shamrock plants that 
symbolize the prisoners' Irish identity and their nationalism. 
"Long Kesh . . . is no place for the Green," Adams' character 
declares in one selection (Cage 125).
The issues of prison conditions and prisoners’ i l l -  
treatment became important ones for Adams and for the movement 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. When he was released in
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1978, Adams reestablished the Sinn Fein Prisoner of War 
committee, and he took part in many conferences held on the 
topic. A rising leader in the movement, Adams was named the 
party's publicity director and elected to the Ard Comhairle1 
upon his release (Keena 80), and he also played a leading role 
in the hunger strikes of 1980/81. It was Adams who established 
the Smash H-Block Committee, which was open to all those who 
supported the prisoners' demands on the "blanket," "no-wash," 
and "dirty" protests, regardless of their position on the use 
of force and the I.R.A. (Keena 86) . Colm Keena underlines 
Adams' impact on the Republican movement: "What Adams had 
announced was a new departure. Up to then Sinn Fein had been 
an organization isolated in the plethora of political 
groupings that existed in Northern Ireland" due to their 
insistence, no matter what the issue, of support for the armed 
struggle (86-87). The prisoners' protests, and Adams evolving 
leadership role on the prison issue, began the process of 
building a new Republican movement: "The republicans were on 
their way towards extending their field of operation" (Keena 
87) .
Adams, through his Brownie articles, publicized the 
details of these substandard prison conditions. Prisoners were 
formally allowed only one vis it per month, with three other 
visits considered "privileges" granted to them at the whim of 
the Prison Governor (Cage 16). Strip searches were conducted
1Central executive
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often, and beatings were administered by the guards. Prison
food was terrible, and the food parcels sent from loved ones
could be stopped at any time and for any reason (Cage 38) .
After Adams and three other Republican prisoners were caught
trying to escape, they were stripped of a ll their clothes and
taken to the punishment cells, where they remained for several
days (Keena 63) . In one Brownie article, Adams vehemently
denounces the British use of solitary confinement, a practice
he calls "unpleasant, soul-destroying and mind-bending:"
Solitary confinement was condemned as far back as 
the end of the nineteenth century by a British 
Parliamentary Committee. Today in Long Kesh 
Republican prisoners are held in solitary twenty- 
four hours a day. They are naked, have no contact 
with the outside world (newspapers, letters, visits 
etc. are stopped), no exercise facilities.
Imagine the uproar in our newspaper columns and 
halls of learning i f  this activity was uncovered in 
South Africa, Chile or Rhodesia. Yet i t  is happening 
now, and only a few hundred yards from where I write 
(Cage 62).
As mentioned previously, British soldiers conducted raids
where prisoners were often beaten. In his biography of Adams,
Colm Keena describes these raids:
At times the inmates would be brought out to the 
wire and put standing against it ,  spread-eagled, 
with their legs back from the wire and their hands 
resting on it .  They might be left there for hours on 
end, a painful experience, particularly on cold dark 
nights with the prisoners dressed only in their 
underwear" (59).
Another oft-heard complaint was the lack of regularly 
supplied clean linen. Often, they received clean sheets once 
every six weeks (Cage 38). Though not commonly known, this was
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one factor in the "dirty" and "blanket" protests by the H- 
Block prisoners in 1980 and 1981 (Keena 87).
These complaints, and others such as the lack of 
educational facilities, were put forward to the Prison
Governor in the fa ll of 1974. Because the prison 
administration refused to consider the requests, food and 
linen protests were begun. The British Army responded with 
more vicious and more frequent raids. The prisoners' 
representatives, or staff, threatened to burn down the camp i f  
the British soldiers came in again to beat the men (Cage 38). 
And on October 15, they made good on their threat. The camp 
was devastated by the fire, and the British used rubber 
bullets and CR gas on the prisoners in the pursuant melee.
It is unclear what part Adams played in the burning of 
Long Kesh. In Cage Eleven, a prisoner's diary describes the 
events of the rioting. Though the demands of the prisoners 
were legitimate, the ultimate end was destruction, a
destruction in which they s t i l l  had to live. Public support, 
however, was considerable, and the prisoners' demands were 
publicized to a much wider audience. This experience likely 
impressed upon Adams the necessity to analyze thoughtfully 
political violence to ensure that such acts achieve the ends 
to which they are aimed, with minimal damage to reputation and 
maximum propaganda impact. This theory is one he proposes in 
another Brownie article and publicly in the speeches and 
interviews in the 1970s after numerous I.R.A. "mistakes" 
(Keena, 159-160, 168) . When the prison is made fairly
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inhabitable and life  is once more routine, the prisoner 
remarks in his diary: "Your Man started his tunnel. 'At last,' 
he said. Things are back to normal" (Cage 45).
At the time of publication of Cage Eleven, there were 
approximately 800 Republican prisoners, most held in Northern 
Ireland, though some were in English and Free State jails 
(Cage 12). Conditions for those prisoners held in English 
jails are the subject of a selection in Cage Eleven that 
concerns Frank Stagg, a Republican prisoner who died in 1976 
while on hunger strike in Wakefield Prison in England. Adams 
informs his reader that most of the Republican prisoners 
serving terms in England are held in solitary confinement 
(Cage 116). The Good Order and Discipline Rule, Rule 43 
G.O.D., provides that a prisoner may be put in solitary 
confinement for an indefinite period of time for any reason 
deemed valid by the Prison Governor. Furthermore, the 
confinement cell is always lighted, either by a red light for 
nighttime or a bright fluorescent one for the day, “making 
sleep impossible." If feasible, the cell is completely bare 
during the day since the bedding material is taken out at 7:00 
a.m. No heating is provided, leaving the cells cold as well as 
damp and "very, very dirty" (Cage 121).
In a moving passage, Adams describes how Frank Stagg 
lived at the time the article was published. Held in a 
solitary confinement cell, he refused to wear prison clothes. 
As an inducement to conform, he is given only a blanket, which 
can be taken away from him at any time. He is given a basin of
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hot water to wash himself, but i t  is taken away immediately 
afterward. Though there is nothing in the cell to find and the 
prisoner has not been out of it ,  the “cell is searched every 
day. A bare, empty dungeon with a naked man in one corner, but 
i t  is searched anyway." More humiliating, strip searches may 
be conducted. At night, guards continually check the cell a 
minimum of twice an hour, further increasing sleep deprivation 
(Cage 122).
For prisoners in England who are not in solitary 
confinement, other restrictions are enforced. Republican 
prisoners are denied educational and gym facilities, their 
mail is sometimes delayed, and their visits are extremely 
restricted. Visitors must remain behind a grille, with guards 
constantly present and taking notes. A visit can be stopped i f  
the conversational tone falls close to a whisper, and no 
physical contact is allowed between the prisoner and his 
visitor. Furthermore, non-Republican prisoners who associate 
with Republicans can also fa ll under these same rules (Cage 
123) .
Probably the most horrendous torture placed upon these 
prisoners is the force-feeding of those on hunger strike. One 
of Cage Eleven's more impressive and gripping non-fiction 
selections concerns this practice. Adams, who while in Long 
Kesh went on hunger strike for two weeks to gain political 
status (Keena 17), details the horror of the procedures 
involved in force-feeding, based on accounts by Republicans he 
knew who had experienced it .  After the guards sufficiently
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immobilize the prisoner, the doctor and an assistant arrive to 
administer the "feeding."
Various methods w ill be employed to open Frank's 
mouth: his nose will be covered to cut off air, or a 
screw or doctor w ill bunch his fists and bore his 
knuckles into the joints on each side of the jaws. A 
Ryle's tube w ill be used. This is a very long, thin 
tube which is pushed through the nose. . . . i t  is 
simply a weapon used to force open the jaws. It rubs 
against the membrane at the back of the nose and, i f  
not coated in lubricant (it seldom is), i t  causes a 
searing pain, akin to a red-hot needle being pushed 
into one's head (Cage 119).
After forcing the jaws of the prisoner open, an 
instrument similar to a horse's bit is used to hold the 3-foot 
long paraffin-covered tube that is pushed down the throat and 
into the stomach. "A funnel is placed on the open end and some 
water poured in. I f  the water bubbles they know the tube is in 
Frank's lungs." Adams notes a Republican prisoner was killed 
in this manner. The prisoner usually vomits after the liquid 
is poured due to the stretching of the stomach. Sometimes the 
doctor w ill force the vomit back down the tube (Cage 119). If 
the prisoner is on thirst strike also, he or she may be given 
food with extra salt, which increases the dehydration (Cage 
1 2 0 ) .
When the tube is being removed i t  tears at the back 
of the throat, more so than before because the 
liquid paraffin w ill have worn off on the way down. 
The last few inches w ill be ghastly. Frank w ill get 
violent pains in his chest. He w ill choke and, at 
this point, he w ill be sicker than before, as the 
tube coming out triggers off more retching.
After "feeding" Frank w ill find i t  impossible to 
stand up, to sit up, or to move in any way (Cage 
1 2 0 ) .
41
Adams' account of force-feeding makes i t  clear why the 
British Medical Association condemned the practice (Cage 118). 
I t  also confirms the Republicans' contentions that the British 
force-fed prisoners as a propaganda ploy, not as a humane act 
of kindness.
These accounts admittedly affected Adams, who declares, 
"My two brief punishment sessions on the boards here, the odd 
beating-up on Brit raids, and the conditions which my visitors 
endure have a ll paled into insignificance beside the plight of 
our people in England. . . . Prisons in Britain are worse and 
are, in truth and fact, living hell-holes" (Cage 117).
I t  was while imprisoned in Long Kesh that Adams began his 
efforts to alter the movement's direction. In 1975, as 
Officer-in-Charge (OC) of Cage 11, Adams directed his energies 
toward his own political education and those of the other men 
in his cage. Prior to his arrival, the cage, operating along 
stric t military lines, had l i t t le  interest in political theory 
and education and "instead of discipline arising out of 
political commitment, i t  was drilled into the prisoners by the 
m ilitaristic regime" (Keena 65), a situation Adams opposed and 
was determined to change.
"Getting to understand the political situation which has 
us here in Long Kesh" was an essential activity of the 
prisoners "and the most time-consuming" (Cage 20). This 
includes reading Irish history and revolutionary books, 
learning Irish Gaelic, and reading other Irish nationalist 
writers, such as James Connolly, Padraig Pearse, and John
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Mitchel. The British government also recognized the
significance of political education, evidenced by its
"criminalization" policy enacted in 1976, whereby political
status was removed and the H-Block cells came into existence.
When this new act took effect, the prisoners' books were taken
away and burned by the guards (Cage 69).
As part of the political educational process, the
prisoners organize and conduct their own Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.
Through expressions of typical political convention rhetoric
and also from impassioned political speeches, the attendees
vote to establish their own programs. These issues are the
very heart of Adams' intended direction for Sinn Fein. Irish
cultural education, including the teaching of Irish and Irish
history in local schools and the need to disseminate that
knowledge to the people, is one of the firs t items up for
discussion, and one on which the prisoners heartily agree.
Joe spoke of the great need for education, 
ordinary people should be involved in get-togethers 
with Republicans, and we should explain our 
attitudes, our tactics, our policy. People should be 
able to complain and criticize; they should be part 
of i t  a ll. . . . Education for Republicans, both
inside and outside the movement, was the beginning, 
the kernel, the foundation for everything (Cage 74; 
emphasis mine).
In his second published Brownie article, one not included 
in Cage Eleven. Adams broadens the Republican notion of 
freedom from British rule to include re-gaining the Irish 
culture, of which the Irish language is a central piece. 
"Without our own language, we w ill be building on sand," Adams 
declared (Keena 70). Other chapters in Cage Eleven also point
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to the centrality of the Irish language. Adams informs the 
reader that the prison's name, Long Kesh, is from the Irish 
Ceis Fhada, "the long ditch" or "basket" (the prison was built 
on a bog). When the British renamed the prison The Maze, they 
unknowingly chose a term that draws its roots from the Irish 
An Ma, which means "the plain" (Cage 108).
Support for and communication with other "true" anti­
imperialist groups in the world and the need to ally the party 
with the working class people of the community and their 
agitation for reform and change are other items on the 
prisoners agenda (Cage 72-75) . Though qualified with "true," 
the anti-imperialist parties are not identified by name or by 
nationality. The need to work closely with the nationalist 
community on issues that affect the daily lives of the people 
is a theme to which Adams will return and stress as president 
of Sinn Fein and in his other writings.
What is especially significant in Adams' description of 
the prisoners' Ard Fheis is what is missing: the military 
struggle for independence. Though Adams remains committed to 
the necessity of armed struggle in the nationalist movement, 
he does not insist support of the I.R.A. is a requirement or 
prerequisite for support of Sinn Fein and its political 
struggle. Adams has shifted the primary emphasis of Sinn Fein 
from military strategy to a political approach.
Those politicians who claim to be nationalists but who 
have condemned the armed struggle, Adams feels, have lost 
their Republican roots. In "Such a Yarn," Adams uses a Celtic
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myth to criticize these political rivals. The story concerns 
Malachi, a great Irish warrior who lived in Dundalk in his 
castle and had the ability to change form. After his wife 
promises that she won't show any fear, he transforms into a 
beautiful blackbird. The spell is broken, however, when a hawk 
flies near the window, his wife screams, and the blackbird 
disappears. But Malachi and his warriors sleep, awaiting the 
trumpet call that w ill alert them so that they may go into 
battle and fight the English and force them from Ireland (Cage 
65) .
One night, a Fianna Fail minister happens by the entrance 
to the cavern where Malachi and his warriors await. He 
stumbles in and awakens one of the warriors, who asks, "Is i t  
time yet?" The minister responds "No, not yet - but i t  won't 
be long now. " Adams urges the reader, i f  he happens to be in 
Dundalk, to go to Malachi's cavern and "Make sure there are no 
Fianna Fail ministers in the vicinity. Then stand well back, 
and scream at the top of your voice: 'C'mon, wake up! Now's 
the time!'" (Cage 66).
This story criticizes the so-called constitutional 
nationalist parties not only for abandoning their 
Republicanism but also, by refusing to fight, sacrificing the 
fundamental rights of freedom and national self-determination 
for the Irish people. Adams, on the other hand, intends for 
the Republican movement to integrate the two strategies and 
for Sinn Fein to concentrate its work on the political
struggle.
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The political parties who abandoned their Republican 
roots and, consequently, their neighbors in the six counties 
of Northern Ireland, and the government of the Republic of 
Ireland receive a blistering condemnation by Brownie and by 
Adams in other works, most specifically in The Politics of 
Irish Freedom. The Free State's jails are notorious for i l l -  
treatment of its prisoners. A priest, Father Faul, publicly
condemned "the regime in Portlaoise Prison . . . [for]
disimproving the men and producing hardened and embittered 
persons" (Cage 6 3 ) . This result is caused by the same 
treatment that is conducted in British jails in the northeast: 
solitary confinement, beatings, and "severe restrictions on 
visits by relatives, lawyers and clergymen" (Cage 63); these 
jails "match British brutality, torture to torture" (Cage
124). In a pamphlet published in September 1976, Adams
declared that the government in the Republic was also at the 
root of the cause of the violence in the North (Keena 66).
I t  is not only the Republic and its politicians who are 
obstacles to the Republican struggle for independence and a
United Ireland, Adams suggests, but the Catholic Church as 
well. Adams does not let his Catholic faith inhibit his strong 
condemnation of the Church's political and social roles in 
Ireland. One of Brownie's cage-mates informs the others that, 
though many Protestants do not know, Pope Innocent I allied 
with William of Orange against the Catholic King James. The 
prisoners are surprised when they are told that "when news of 
[William's] victory at the Boyne reached Rome a Te Deum was
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sung at the Vatican, and there were celebrations in the other 
main Catholic cities, too" (Cage 85) . The reason, they are 
told, is simple: "The, Pope and all the rest wanted to curb the 
power of France, " and James Stuart was a French ally (Cage 
85) . Cedric, another prisoner in the cage, points out the 
irony of the Pope's support, including financial, of William: 
after the battle "all religious were banned except the 
Episcopalian Church" (Cage 86). The Pope had, in effect, 
sacrificed his followers' faith for the principle of power.
In a piece entitled "Christians for Freedom?", Adams 
cites the words of Catholic priests to corroborate his 
arguments that the Catholic Church hierarchy has failed to aid 
its Irish adherents in their efforts for national freedom: 
"the Catholic Church has failed miserably to fu lf i l l  its role 
in Ireland" (Cage 101) . Adams is aware, however, that 
Republicans have traditionally been seen as “anti-clerical," 
which is why he applies the priests own words to back up his 
claims.
Due to the inability of the common Irish Catholic people 
to identify with the Church hierarchy and vice-versa, an ever- 
increasing isolation has developed. The Catholic Church has 
traditionally played a central role in the shaping of public 
opinion and, consequently, policies in Ireland. While Adams 
acknowledges this, he does not condemn that influence in and 
of itse lf. In fact, Adams displays the traditionalist and 
conservative component of the Republican movement by stressing 
that "surely in our new Ireland . . . our attitudes must be in
47
step with people's thinking, geared to their spiritual as well 
as social needs" (Cage 102).
While the Catholic Church loudly condemns the I.R.A. and
those who support it ,  the Irish people must deal with problems
much closer to home: primarily poverty, unemployment, and bad
housing. As one priest puts it,
Sometimes one would think that as far as the 
churches are concerned the only problem in Ireland 
is 'the men of violence1. There has been very l i t t le  
compassion for the many people caught up in the web 
of physical violence. There has been l i t t le  effort 
to show any non-violent way of bringing about change 
in society" (Cage 103) .
These priests see Christianity as a “radical message" and 
a "revolution of the left" that can help the people to 
overcome oppression. They also acknowledge that violence is 
committed by both sides. "Institutionalized violence of the 
kind we have seen in the North is just as bad and has to be 
eradicated before we can look at the rest," another priest 
declares (Cage 103) . Inhumane prison conditions and torture 
are roundly condemned by another as violations of the state 
and of the Church. Finally, a Bishop who called for the 
British to withdraw from Northern Ireland "was met by a 
deafening silence from his fellow dignitories. He spoke alone" 
(Cage 104) .
The institutionalized violence to which the priests refer 
is the subject of another Brownie article, appropriately 
entitled "Terrorism." Adams cites the definition of terrorism 
from the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973:
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Terrorism means the use of violence for political 
ends and includes any use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the 
public in fear (Cage 60).
Adams argues that those acts that f i t  in the above definition 
include acts committed by members of the British army, its 
government, and members of the R.U.C. and U.D.R. (Ulster 
Defence Regiment) since they use violence (beatings, threats 
and intimidation, house searches, for instance) in pursuance 
of political goals and in so doing, they put a “section of the 
public," i.e. the nationalist community, "in fear."
As an example, he gives the British government's refusal 
to release prisoners held for the Guildford and Woolwich 
bombings. He declares that the real perpetrators have 
confessed and given details so "precise that there can be no 
doubting their authenticity" (Cage 60-61). Witnesses also 
corraborate their involvement. The British "couldn't catch the 
IRA units involved," Adams asserts. "So they invented 'IRA 
units' they could catch," and now refuse to release those 
wrongly imprisoned for the bombings (Cage 61).
The beatings and other torture meted out to the internees 
and other prisoners are acts that also f i t  the British 
government's terrorism definition. Adams demonstrates the 
British government's hypocrisy when it  loudly complains and 
denounces torturous treatment a British doctor suffered at the 
hands of Chilean police (Cage 116) , while at the same time 
continuing to conduct the same tortuous acts on the prisoners 
under its care. The British, in fact, were found guilty of 
using "scientific 'sensory depreciation' experiments" on
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fourteen internees, among them Adams' cousin Liam Hannaway, by 
the Hague's Court of Human Rights (Keena 49). Furthermore, the 
British continued the practice of solitary confinement - for 
days at a time - even though it ,  too, had been condemned by a 
British Parliamentary Committee (Cage 62). A Scottish lawyer, 
Alastair Logan, researched the conditions of Republican 
prisoners in British jails and strongly denounced their i l l -  
treatment, including the beatings by police during 
interrogations of which Adams had first-hand experience (Cage 
62-63). The Association for Legal Justice, Adams adds, 
conferred in its condemnation of Republican prisoners' 
treatment and i l l  conditions (Cage 62).
Despite all this evidence and all these public 
denouncements, "no British soldier, RUC man, policeman or 
screw has ever served a day in prison since 1969 for murder or 
torture committed while on duty" (Cage 63) . The reason, Adams 
points out, is contained in the very document that defines 
terrorism: the Emergency Provisions Act specifically e x c lu d e s  
these people, and applies only "to persons who have attained 
the age of fourteen and are not serving members of Her 
Majesty's regular naval, m ilita ry  or a ir  force" (Cage 63; 
emphasis mine). Adams concludes the piece with a hard-hitting, 
"Would the real terrorists stand up, please?" (Cage 63).
Just as the British should have constraints on their 
actions, so should those who are involved in the armed 
struggle for Irish freedom. In the article "In Defence of 
Danny Lennon," a poignant Brownie article on the death of one
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of his cage-mates who was an I.R.A. volunteer, Adams outlines
these constraints and his philosophy on the use of force in
the Republican struggle and the responsibility to the entire
movement of those who participate in the armed struggle. Danny
Lennon was shot dead by British soldiers during a car chase
(Lennon was carrying a r ifle  at the time) and crashed into a
woman, Anne Maguire, and her four children, of which three
were killed (Mrs. Maguire claimed her children were shot dead
by the British before the car hit them) (Keena 66).
Adams, while offering his condolences to the family,
expresses his understanding that what he says, and what the
Republican movement does, may be misunderstood. He emphasizes
that those in the movement must take responsibility for its
actions and "face any criticism in the knowledge that we are
not always in the best position to justify our stand, our
philosophy and our activities." He also makes the argument,
which he w ill repeat in later works and speeches, that those
in the armed struggle must ensure they do not harm those who
are innocent and, consequently, damage the movement's
reputation among the community (Cage 135).
We can and we must do our utmost to ensure that 
everything we do w ill have the minimum effect on
those people with no vested interest in opposing us 
and we must, on a personal level, ensure that our 
conduct, our discipline and our attitude w ill 
encourage, not discourage continued support for the 
republican cause (Cage 135).
His argument is powerful and resolute and is aimed
directly at the members of the I.R.A. Their actions,
essentially, must be in harmony with the political and social
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philosophy of the Republican movement. Adams is emphasizing 
and demanding that the armed segment of the movement be 
subordinate to the political segment of the movement, largely 
represented by Sinn Fein.
He continues by declaring that Danny Lennon knew the
risks he was taking and "did not willingly involve others in
that risk." His fight, Adams maintains, was one in which those
children would be free and truly sovereign. "His death, which
robbed the Maguire children of their lives, was a
contradiction of a l ife spent fighting for young children such
as they" (Cage 136). The armed struggle, for Adams and for the
Danny Lennons of the movement, is necessary to achieve the
goal of a united and free Ireland for all its citizens. But i t
need not include injuring those who are innocent and who do
not actively seek to oppose them and are not responsible for
the horrible conditions which are forced upon the Catholic
community. Nevertheless, Adams states,
None of us stands guiltless; only our children are 
innocent. It remains for us to ensure that we build 
a society in which they w ill not be robbed of their 
innocence. Then and only then w ill we have the peace 
that ordinary people everywhere deserve and desire 
(Cage 137).
Adams' Brownie articles included in Cage Eleven 
concentrate primarily on the prisoners' conditions and their 
daily lives, including beatings by guards, British Army raids, 
and the consequences of their imprisonment on their loved 
ones. It  is the prison issue that helped catapult Adams into a 
leadership role in the Republican movement, as his reputation
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for intelligent analysis and a critical approach to problems 
grew. He also became known for his moving speeches and talent 
for persuasion. While in prison, Adams encouraged and shaped 
the educational process of the prisoners, a process that 
included a critical assessment of the Republican movement and 
political discussion about its future direction. That 
political education and participation is so important is 
evidenced in the prisoners' Ard Fheis and the policies that 
emerge from it .
Adams also explores the roles of both the Catholic Church 
and the Republic of Ireland in the conflict and struggle in 
the North, concluding that they both failed their communities 
and became not only obstacles in the fight for freedom but 
part of the problem also. The role of the armed struggle is 
also briefly discussed, and Adams makes clear his view that 
political violence must serve political ends.
Falls__Memories and Cage Eleven trace the process, from
childhood to a young Republican prisoner, through which Adams 
arrived at his political theories, and they form the basis 
upon which Adams w ill build his more complete Republican 
philosophy. It  is in The Politics of Irish Freedom that these 
themes come together to form his cohesive "personal statement" 
of modern Irish Republicanism.
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Chapter I I I
Collective Leadership and Republican Philosophy:
T h e  P o lit ic s  o f  I r is h  F re e d o m
The Politics of Irish Freedom, published in 1986, is
Gerry Adams' most comprehensive political work. Adams
describes i t  as a "personal statement" meant only to give 
readers, especially those uninformed and detached from the 
situation, the chance to learn about modern Irish
Republicanism. What he offers, however, is a more
comprehensive definition of the movement, its political and 
economic philosophy, and his ideas for its future development 
and direction.
All of the issues covered in Falls Memories and Cage 
Eleven are included in this work, but in much more detail, and 
Adams incorporates them into his overall Republican
philosophy. The nature of British rule in the 6 county 
statelet and the forces of sectarianism and discrimination 
inherent in Northern Ireland combine, Adams asserts, to create 
conditions that make separation from England necessary for 
meaningful reform. The horrid conditions endured by Republican 
prisoners, the British government's botched handling of their 
subsequent hunger strikes and its violent reaction to the non­
violent c iv il rights movement of the late 1960s solidifies the 
Republican position of the necessity of immediate British 
withdrawal and the use of armed conflict to bring i t  about. 
Irish Republicanism, however, includes more than the demand to 
end partition and a defense of the armed struggle to bring
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about that goal; i t  encompasses anti-sectarianism, freedom of 
religion, pluralism, and the revitalization of Irish culture. 
Sinn Fein, as the political organization most closely 
associated with the modern Irish Republican movement, is 
responsible for garnering support from the nationalist 
community for its philosophy, and has, under Adams leadership, 
begun the arduous process of becoming a politically relevant 
party. I t  is also the primary driving force of the movement 
its e lf.
The fundamental nature of British rule in Ireland, both 
past and present, Adams argues, is unjust, and this theme is 
repeated throughout Adams' writings. Adams decries the use of 
violence by the British in both the establishment of the 
statelet and its continued maintenance. "By its very nature 
the British presence is not and never has been a just or 
peaceful presence and because of this relationships between 
the Irish and British peoples have been poisoned" (Politics 
89) .
The statelet of Northern Ireland, Adams continues, was 
founded on sectarian privilege, and, by extension, the 
discrimination against another section of the community. As in 
other historical cases of plantation, the settlers are given 
rewards, usually in the form of land taken from the 
dispossessed natives, for their loyalty and continued 
settlement (Politics 114) . In Ireland, these privileges were
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extended to the English and Scottish Protestant settlers1, 
and, when threat of national independence arose, an area 
carved from the province of Ulster ensured their numerical 
majority and their continued place of privilege. Northern 
Ireland was to be ruled by one party, the Unionist Party, that 
represented Britain's interests, which were made clear by 
LLoyd George: "We must make sure that Ulster does not, whether 
she wills i t  or not, merge with the rest of Ireland" (Politics 
19). The Stormont parliament was established, in the words of 
Sir Edward Carson, to be "a Protestant parliament for a 
Protestant people." Adams maintains that not only were the 
political institutions of the statelet set up to guarantee 
Protestant ascendancy, but the British also used obviously 
undemocratic and coercive means to maintain i t .  The "A", "B", 
and "C" Specials were "the armed wing of Protestant Unionism .
uniformed, organised and paid for by the British 
government" (Politics 19). Ward-rigging, restrictive voting 
qualifications, the abolishment of proportional 
representation, and the coercive powers outlined in the 
Special Powers Act (1922) were other "active means by which 
the existence of the state was maintained and a ll opposition 
was suppressed" (Politics 20-21). Even when other areas of the 
United Kingdom were granted democratic rights, such as
1
The English settlers were primarily Anglican (Church of 
England), while the Scottish settlers were Presbyterian. Irish 
Gaelic has no word for Presbyterian, so the natives used 
Albanach, which means "Scotch," and they used Sassnach, 
meaning "English," to refer to Anglican (Cronin 9).
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universal suffrage in 1945, Northern Ireland was specifically 
excluded (Politics 21) .
Adams asserts that this history made clear not only the 
fact that the minority population had to be continually 
oppressed for the preservation of the status quo, i.e. 
Protestant ascendancy, but that Britain was ultimately 
responsible. Lloyd George's statement only corroborated what 
many acts of the English Parliament outlined. Contrary to 
British propaganda that depicts Britain as a unbiased third 
party, Adams declares, "all relevant Acts exclude any right 
[of Northern Ireland] to secession" (Politics 19) . The British 
parliament is the supreme authority according to the act 
establishing the statelet, Stormont was given no real powers, 
and Britain s t i l l  influences both North and South of the 
border (Politics 19, 20, 23). "This utterly undemocratic
system was established, is controlled by and is the 
responsibility of the British government," Adams declares 
(Po l i t i cs 89).
Adams' experience with the c iv il rights movement of the 
late 1960s further strengthened his belief that the British 
were intransigent on the issue of Northern Ireland. Adams, a 
founding member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA), participated in the non-violent movement 
to gain c iv il rights for Catholic citizens (Politics 12). This 
movement, a catalyst for the 197 0 split in the Republican 
movement, was heavily influenced by the c iv il rights movement 
for blacks in the United States (Politics 9). Both struggles
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employed non-violent methods with the objective of reform and 
change within the system. But unlike its U.S. precursor, Adams 
asserts, the movement in Northern Ireland was doomed to 
failure because the state was irreformable, a fact that the 
Dublin leadership of the Republican movement neglected to see. 
Though NICRA's demands were "unremarkable, simple and 
moderate"2 (Politics 34), the British responded violently, 
banning demonstrations, encouraging sectarian attacks on 
Catholic neighborhoods, houses, and their persons’, and 
refusing to protect those people from attack, even though the 
Catholic community in itia lly  welcomed the arrival of British 
troops (Politics 31, 32, 33-34, 54). The British, Adams and 
others in the Republican movement concluded, could not be seen 
as an unbiased party to the situation, and "the state had made 
abundantly  clear the fact that i t  would not and could not 
implement democratic reforms" (Politics 34).
The c iv il rights movement also widened the philosophical 
gap in the Republican movement between the Dublin leadership 
and Adams and other Northern activists. The Republicans had 
largely disarmed after the failed border campaign of the 
1950s, concentrating on political aspects of the struggle. The 
Dublin leadership's direction of the c iv il rights movement, 
Adams felt, failed to grasp the reality of the nature of the
2NICRA’s demands were universal franchise in local 
elections (1 man, 1 vote); an end to gerrymandered boundaries; 
the repeal of the Special Powers Act; an end to discrimination 
against Catholics in housing and unemployment; disbandment of 
the B-Specials; and the withdrawal of the Unionist b ill to 
outlaw c iv il rights demonstrations (Politics 13).
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statelet and seriously underestimated the reaction by its 
Unionist rulers (Politics 4, 32, 34-35). The leadership argued 
that the national question should be put on the backburner, in 
an effort to gain Protestant and Catholic solidarity, while 
the primary focus was political democratization of the state 
(Politics 13-14) . Adams and other Republicans "on the ground” 
disagreed, contending that this theory contained a major flaw: 
"the 'stages' theory of progressive democratization was 
conditional in the firs t place on the state and its supporters 
being willing to redress the state's own injustices" (Politics 
14). They predicted a heavy-handed response from the state and 
from loyalists and pleaded for preparedness for the coming 
violence (Politics 32) . When that violence came, the 
leadership found itself unprepared to defend the Catholic 
areas under siege, and the effects of the movement were as 
Adams predicted. For instance, by August 1969, 1505 Catholic 
families and 315 Protestant families had been forced to flee 
from their homes, constituting the biggest refugee movement in 
Europe since the second World War ended (Keena 38) . Though the 
c iv il rights movement asked only for reforms to be made within 
the Northern Ireland statelet, and not its abolition, the 
question of national independence inevitably took the front 
seat (Politics 34).
The republican strategy of organizing politically to 
achieve democracy within the state, which had 
involved a turning away from the physical force 
tradition and a dumping of arms, had run headlong 
into the reality of the irreformably sectarian 
state. . . . The republican movement of the 1960s
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had proved incapable of responding adequately to 
events as they evolved in the 6 counties (Politics 
34) .
The Dublin leadership's philosophy had proved incorrect, 
and the inevitable split in the Republican movement occurred 
in 1970, an event Adams calls "a major set-back" (Politics 
35). Primarily as a result of the movement's ill-preparedness, 
the Provisional wing developed an "almost exclusively military 
road" (Politics x) , ignoring any political processes i t  had 
developed in the 1960s. But Adams stresses that the failure of 
the Republican movement in this era was not due only to the 
lack of military defense; instead "the primary problem was 
lack of politics, a shortcoming which was to remain even after 
guns had become plentiful." The emerging Provisional wing was 
"inadequate . . . [because] i t  had l i t t le  or no proper 
educational process, no formal politicisation courses and 
there was scant regard paid by the leadership to such needs"
(Politics 35) . As the t it le  of his book confirms, politics is 
vital and central to Adams' vision of the modern Irish 
Republican movement, a vision that he began to make reality 
during the hunger strikes of 1980/81.
As Cage Eleven emphasized, prison and prison conditions 
were important components in Adams' political education. After 
his release from Long Kesh, Adams and the Republican movement 
placed a greater emphasis on the prisoners' cause. Britain's 
policy of "criminalisation" was part of an overall propaganda 
and political strategy designed to depict the situation as a 
criminal one and deny its political nature. This strategy also
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included "Ulsterisation," where the R.U.C. and U.D.R. were 
placed on the front lines of battle to bolster Britain's 
professed neutral third-party position. Adams saw both these 
policies as Britain's effort to avoid responsibility not only 
for the conflict but also for the horrid, undemocratic state 
that i t  sustained (Politics 71).
While Britain claimed the Republican prisoners were 
"ordinary criminals," Adams stresses the contradiction in the 
whole array of special legislation that dealt with them as 
"special category" prisoners.
Special courts had been established, known as the 
Diplock courts, to deprive those accused of 'special 
category' or 'scheduled' offenses of tr ia l by jury. 
Special concentration camps had been constructed to 
house those convicted of special category offences 
as well as those interned without tr ia l. To turn 
around then and deny that these were special 
category prisoners was to fly in the face of logic 
and reason (Politics 71-72) .
The prisoners began a blanket protest by refusing to wear 
prison clothes shortly after “criminalisation" officia lly 
began in March of 1976. It progressed into a "no-wash" protest 
in 1978 after prison guards began to attack the prisoners, and 
in the process kicked their chamber pots and threw them on 
their beds (Politics 74). The hunger strikes arose only after 
Adams and members of prison reform groups such as his H- 
Block/Armagh Committee and the Relatives Action Committee 
campaigned for political status to be regained and prison 
conditions to improve (Politics 74-75) . Adams and Sinn Fein 
opposed the hunger strikes because they fe lt the movement was
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not politically prepared and the prison issue was not a top 
priority at that time (Politics 78).
This inability of political success by the Republicans 
can be traced partially to Sinn Fein's political inexperience 
and weak organization arising from the movement's historical 
conspiratorial nature. Adams was determined to correct this 
situation, and the Westminster by-election won by Bobby Sands, 
the firs t man to go on hunger strike in 1981, gave the 
Republicans their firs t opportunity at electoral intervention. 
This was a turning point in the movement; electoral strategy 
was now considered a legitimate tactic, and i t  also "did away 
with spectator politics," bringing in more people to 
participate actively in the Republican movement without taking 
up arms. By far the most important effect of the Republicans' 
involvement with the hunger strikes was its "educational 
value" (Politics 86) .
The electoral successes during the hunger strikes (two 
other prisoners were elected to Leinster House, the Republic's 
legislature, and another Sinn Fein member elected MP after 
Sands' death), not only hastened the party's electoral 
maturation, but Adams argued that the votes "exposed the lie 
that the hunger strikers -- and by extension the IRA and the 
whole republican movement -- had no popular support" (Politics 
80). The British government, by allowing ten young prisoners 
to die, portrayed itse lf once again as intransigent and 
unwilling to make reforms. After the strike was called off,
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primarily by the relatives of the remaining strikers, the five 
reforms3 demanded were slowly put in place (Politics 85) .
From his analysis of British rule, the British reaction 
to the non-violent c iv il rights movement, and its treatment of 
the hunger strikers and their demands, Adams concludes that 
the statelet cannot be reformed, and furthermore, Britain w ill 
never voluntarily withdraw. The British, Adams argues, w ill 
not leave willingly for a variety of reasons. First, Ireland 
provides a "considerable marketplace" for British goods, and 
"its industrial base is dominated from Britain." Second, i f  
control of Ireland is relinquished, the Scottish and Welsh 
nationalist groups w ill have a successful example to emulate. 
Third, "any radicalisation of Irish society becomes a threat 
to the British establishment" by encouraging that 
radicalisation in Britain also (Politics 97). This point is 
echoed by Ken Livingstone, a British Labour leader and 
outspoken opponent of the British presence in Ireland, in his 
essay in Ireland After Britain: "We may get to see Ireland 
giving us the lead in the establishment of a socialist society 
in these islands" (17). But the most important reason Britain 
refuses to withdraw is the threat of Ireland as a united and 
independent nation. "Such an independent Ireland," Adams
3These demands were: the right to wear their own 
clothing; exemption from prison labor; free association among 
Republican prisoners; the right to organize recreational and 
educational programs; and fu ll restoration of remission 
(Politics 80) .
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declares, "would pass out of Britain's combined colonial and 
neo-colonial control" (Politics 97).
Given this reasoning, armed conflict in the struggle for 
Irish national freedom becomes necessary in order to bring 
about a British withdrawal. "The tactic of armed struggle is 
of primary importance because i t  provides a vital cutting 
edge. Without it ,"  Adams argues, "the issue of Ireland would 
not even be an issue" (Politics 64) . There is an important 
distinction, however, in Adams' vision of the role of armed 
conflict and the historical role i t  has played in Irish 
Republicanism. The militaristic tendency has most often been 
dominant in the movement, and that tendency was always "fairly 
apolitical" (Politics 7-8) . In the 1960s, the movement became 
politicized and de-militarized, and the split in 1970 formed 
two groups, one political and anti-republican (the Officials) 
and the other military (the Provisionals). Adams was 
instrumental in altering the course of the Republican movement 
as represented by the Provisionals. He was dismayed that the 
movement had abandoned the political approach that i t  
developed in the 1960s, and he campaigned for its 
reinstatement. Today, Adams declares, "there is a realisation 
in republican circles that armed struggle on its own is 
inadequate and that non-armed forms of political struggle are 
at least as important" (Politics 64). Adams is primarily 
responsible for that attitude.
Part of the broad political strategy, of which armed 
struggle is an essential component, includes garnering and
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maintaining the support of the community. While Adams argues 
that the I.R.A. functions with a large degree of community 
support in the 6 counties, and indeed could not function 
without it ,  a ll armed operations must be carefully planned and 
should continue that support, not undermine i t  (Politics 67, 
63) . Adams never denies the "considerable moral problems" of 
armed conflict (Politics 64). Indeed, he "deeply regret [s] " 
civilian casualties of I.R.A. actions, stressing that he "has 
never tried to justify civilian casualties or fatalities of 
IRA actions." (Politics 52). But he staunchly argues that "IRA 
volunteers are actually civilians, political people" who 
believe armed action is a "political necessity," in stark 
contrast to the "careerists" in a state's established army 
(Politics 65) .
As Adams emphasized in Cage Eleven, political education
is the source from which Republicans develop their ideas and
their convictions, and i t  becomes a prerequisite for becoming
a Republican. Adams not only stresses the need for such
education, but he also underlines the distinction between
political construction and destruction.
As volunteers develop their politics, their vision 
of the goal they are aiming for, as they come to 
understand the politics of their opponents and the 
way the struggle needs to develop, then comes an 
understanding that armed struggle itse lf is a tactic 
and that one cannot shoot or bomb an independent 
Ireland into existence. You may be able to bomb and 
shoot a British connection out of existence, given 
many other necessary political conditions, but you 
w ill not bring anything into existence (Politics 64; 
emphasis mine).
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The armed struggle, therefore, is a tactic that "becomes 
armed propaganda" (Politics 64). And all propaganda serves a 
political purpose. From this premise, the armed struggle must 
always serve its political objective, i.e. withdrawal of 
British forces from Northern Ireland and a 32 county Ireland. 
Any action, Adams asserts, that does not serve that purpose is 
an incorrect action and counterproductive (Politics 52) . Once 
again, Adams has emphasized the primacy of the political 
objective over the military aspect of the struggle. In his
concluding chapter, he sums up this theory in a passage 
reminiscent of his Brownie column "In Defence of Danny 
Lennon":
We must place our objectives before the people . . .
[W]e are not always in the best position to 
justify our stand, our philosophy or our activities.
We must therefore ensure that our conduct, our 
attitudes and our discipline, in the face of a
powerful and unscrupulous enemy, w ill encourage, not 
discourage, continued support for the objectives we 
strive for (Politics 167) .
The modern Irish Republican movement that Adams has 
helped shape is much more than the armed struggle, as his 
commitment to the political approach confirms, and these
objectives to which he refers have also been broadened since 
Adams became involved in the movement. The conspiratorial 
nature of the movement was born from its military struggle and 
the necessity of secrecy. But by the mid 1960s, a major
critical appraisal of the movement had begun, and the members 
began to consider, for the first time since the 1930s, "what 
type of republic was aimed at" (Politics 8) . Adams found the
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conclusions that emerged from the Republicans' analysis to be
critical to the movement's future political strategy.
What came most clearly from these discussions was a 
recognition that republicans needed to identify 
their philosophy as being relevant not to the vision 
of a future Ireland but to the actual Ireland of 
today, and that they needed to enlist mass support, 
or at least the maximum support possible, for the 
republican cause. . . .  We could not free the Irish 
people. We could only, with their support, create 
conditions in which they would free themselves 
(Politics 8) .
This analysis also determined that the struggle of
independence in Ireland was class-based, a notion that
partially led Adams and his supporters to advocate a socialist
republic as the preferred society of a united Ireland
(Politics 7) . I t  is from the Young Ireland movement and
Connolly that the movement derives its "radical social
dimension," and Adams stresses that "capitalistic ideas,
feudalism and the concept of private property . . . have been
imported into Ireland, not socialist ideas" (Politics 133,
139). Adams divorces himself and the movement from others who
call themselves socialists, such as Hitler's Nazis, Fidel
Castro, and Mikhail Gorbachev (Politics 129). For Adams,
Socialism is . . .  a definite form of society in 
which the main means of production, distribution and 
exchange are socially owned and controlled and in 
which production is based on human need rather than 
private profit (Politics 128).
Because this socialism is based on society’s control of 
the economy, Adams maintains, there can be no socialist 
society without real national independence (Politics 128) . 
Thus, the "acid test" of a real Irish socialist is his
67
"attitude to the issue of Irish national self-determination, "
and Adams finds the proclaimed Irish socialists seriously
lacking. They may give rhetorical support to independence, but
their actions contradict their assertions (Politics 128, 129).
Indeed, they reveal their hypocrisy by publicly supporting
armed struggles for national liberation in other countries,
particularly South Africa, while condemning the I.R.A.'s
actions on their own doorstep (Politics 129, 130) .
For practical and political reasons, however, Adams
stresses that Republicanism "should not at this stage of its
development style itse lf 'socialist-republican'" (Politics
132). Instead, Republicanism "refers to the aim of securing
national independence in its broadest sense," and the building
of the government and society of a united Ireland is an
activity that should involve all Irish people, including
Protestants (Politics 131, 123).
Irish Republicanism, Adams declares, "is not and never
has been a static concept; i t  is a living and developing
ideology" (Politics 133). An essential part of that ideology
is anti-sectarianism. Adams wants to assure the Protestants in
the 6 counties that religious freedom is a principle upon
which the Republican movement is based and on which
Republicans want a united Ireland founded.
There is no way that in terms of religious liberty 
either Protestants or Catholics have anything to 
fear from republicans. And there is no way that 
republicans, in pursuit of a secular or at least 
pluralist society, want to see any religious 
hierarchy given a position as of right as part of 
the state. Republicans want to limit the control of
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the churches to things spiritual and to treat
everyone as equal before God (Politics 122).
Adams also points out that Republicans have been condemned 
much more by the Catholic hierarchy than any loyalist 
paramilitary group (Politics 122).
In a united Ireland, the Protestant community, Adams 
argues, though i t  would lose its historical ascendancy 
position, would gain equality under the law. The Protestant
working class, Adams observes, is as poor as the Catholic one, 
and he proposes a government that would aid both communities 
(Politics 23). Republicans desire a representative legislature 
that guarantees liberties and "has no vested interest in
disadvantaging anyone" (Politics 123), and Protestants "can 
have and should have a very big say" in the process of
creating a constitution and the new Irish society (Politics 
124) .
One of the more recent developments in Unionist 
propaganda is the insistence that Protestants in Northern 
Ireland are not Irish (Politics 140) . Adams wholeheartedly 
disagrees, mentioning that the English refer to both community 
members derogatorily as "Paddies" (Politics 124). Protestants 
also played a valuable role in the firs t Irish cultural and 
linguistic groups that sought to revitalize the culture 
(Politics 143) . Even the name for Sinn Fein was chosen by a 
Protestant woman (Cronin 99).
Culture plays a significant role in Republican ideology, 
which is the major reason why Unionists distance themselves 
from it .  While culture is apolitical, Adams reasons, the
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British tried to exterminate the Irish culture, and as a
result, the "restoration of our culture must be a crucial part
of our political struggle" (Politics 143-44). The Irish
language, as he argued in Cage Eleven, is the central element
in this cultural revitalization because i t  is through language
that culture is communicated, maintained, and enhanced. "When
the language is lost everything i t  represents is also lost"
(Politics 138). The intent of the Republicans' revitalization
effort is not, however, a romantic attempt to go back to the
past. It is, instead, an attempt to
recover the best of our traditional values and mould 
them to the present. Our national culture should 
reflect the combination of the different influences 
within the nation: urban and rural, Gaeltacht and 
Galltacht, northern and southern, orange and green 
(Politics 139-40) .
Again, i t  is evident in these words that the Republican intent 
is not to ostracize the Protestant community in a united 
Ireland, but rather to include it .
Sinn Fein's role in the revitalization of culture is as 
strong as i t  is in the other aspects of the movement. The 
party has erected bilingual or fully Irish Gaelic street 
signs, organized language classes in social organizations, 
advocated the establishment of a ll-Irish nursery schools, and 
campaigned for increased Irish Gaelic radio and television 
programs (Politics 145, 147). There are signs that these
efforts are succeeding, though i t  w ill be many years before a 
thorough investigation can determine success or failure.
70
Sinn Fein's leadership of the Republican movement extends 
to cultural revitalization efforts, campaign on prison reform, 
and elections. The party is primarily responsible for the 
movement's political agenda and strategy, but this was not 
always the case. It was only with its campaign to remove the 
government's ban on the party, which was lifted in 1974, that 
the movement began to organize politically and analyze its 
political strategy (Politics 9). And i t  was only after the 
1985 local elections that Sinn Fein seriously began to develop 
a political organization capable of supporting its candidates 
and its constituents, an organization that Adams admits is 
s t i l l  weak (Politics 151).
Sinn Fein s t i l l  faces tough obstacles in its aim of 
political relevancy and the maintenance and increase of 
community support. While i t  is the only party besides The 
Workers Party to be active in both the Republic and the 6 
counties, only Sinn Fein faces censorship by the Republic. 
Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act prevents radio and 
television interviews of Sinn Fein members or any others who 
condone political violence. While these interviews have often 
taken place with voice-overs, the law nonetheless has had a 
silencing effect, one which the U.S. Supreme Court might call 
a "chilling effect." The Republic's Supreme Court recently 
upheld the law in its March 1993 ruling which allowed the 
interview of a Sinn Fein member (without a voice-over) on the 
subject of a strike. Many radio and television personnel 
reportedly were hoping i t  would be struck down (Irish Emigrant
71
no. 322). Further oppressive tactics are used in the Republic 
by Special Branch units who harass and intimidate potential 
recruits and new members (Politics 149).
Sinn Fein's members have also been targets of loyalist 
assassination gangs, and Adams asserts that his party "of all 
the political parties. . . . has suffered most in this regard" 
(Politics 150). Amid the renewed bombing campaigns in England 
in 1993, attacks on the party's members continued. In the 
space of a few days in March 1993, a Sinn Fein member was shot 
and killed by loyalists as he arrived for work and another 
Sinn Fein member was a target of a grenade attack on his home. 
Grenades were also thrown into the homes of three other 
politicians, one a Sinn Fein councillor, and the other two 
SDLP councillors. The U.F.F. claimed responsibility for these 
attacks, as well as an ambush of five Catholic workers in the 
same week, an action that claimed the lives of two of the 
targeted men, only one of whom was an actual I.R.A. member 
(Irish Emigrant no. 321). The combination of repressive 
measures and assassination attacks have damaged the party's 
ability to recruit, an activity that Adams has worked 
diligently to improve.
Prior to the 1970s, recruits joined Sinn Fein largely as 
a response to repressive measures by the state, such as 
internment, Bloody Sunday, and loyalist pogroms of Catholics, 
such as the ones that occurred in 1969. Adams, however, argued 
that such recruitment encouraged and increased "the lack of 
unified political consciousness." As a result, Sinn Fein was
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perceived by people in the 6 counties as "a poor second cousin 
to the IRA" (Politics 130). Adams' solution was to institute a 
more formal political education process for the party's 
members and to distribute more political documents on the 
Republican position in the community. The political education 
of the party's members, however, holds the key. "As Sinn Fein 
becomes more relevant on a whole range of issues and more 
competent on the national question, a steady and consistent 
flow of recruits into our ranks" should result (Politics 130). 
As revealed in Falls Memories and Cage Eleven. Adams' own 
political education provided the necessary key to his 
political participation, his understanding of the problems, 
and his conviction for the solutions he proposed. I t  is, then, 
a logical conclusion to place political education at the 
forefront of the needs for the modern Republican movement.
Political education, in Adams' view, is more than just 
the digestion of propaganda material. I t  involves self- 
criticism and constant analysis of the movement's goals and 
strategies. Sinn Fein put this theory into practice in the 
late 1970s by making the party's Ard Fheiseanna open to 
motions on any issue. Even though this principle presents 
d ifficu lt practical problems, Adams insists that i t  is vital 
to the continued participation by the membership and the 
prevention of the conference turning into a "jamboree" (which 
also adequately describes the political conventions of the two 
major U.S. parties), where policies are determined before the
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conference by an elite group of politicians and the meeting 
becomes merely a social event (Politics 162-63).
Adams' theory of leadership is the foundation upon which 
this view of national conferences is based. The party's 
membership must support its policies, and, Adams asserts, this 
support can only arise i f  the people understand the issues and 
the reasoning behind the policies enacted (Politics 157). Open 
discussion and debate, along with the leadership's continual 
self-assessment, is vital. The leadership of the movement, and 
of Sinn Fein in particular, "striv[es] for a situation where 
our membership participates in the decision-making process in 
the fullest way possible and to the fullest extent" (Politics 
155) .
Collective leadership is not just an imaginative theory;
i t  is a theory Adams practices. Ken Livingstone succinctly
describes Adams unique leadership style:
I f  you sit and watch Gerry Adams in a group of 
people, he does not dominate i t .  He lets other 
people talk, he hears a consensus emerging, he 
doesn't try to provide charismatic dominating 
leadership. . . . [At a Sinn Fein Ard Fheis] when
somebody had made the point that Gerry Adams wanted 
to make, he le ft the queue and returned to his seat 
(17) .
Adams also argues that i t  is essential that the Republican
leadership continually assess its positions and admit its
mistakes. Again, political education is the key to making 
collective leadership work. Unlike other parties whose
leaderships "expect their members to accept that their 
leadership should be permitted to do their thinking for them,"
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Sinn Fein demands that the membership be involved in that 
process (Politics 155).
What makes collective leadership necessary in the 
Republican movement, more so than in other established 
political parties like those in the United States, is the 
nature of the struggle in which Republicans are engaged. The 
historical secrecy surrounding the movement is one that is 
steadily being broken and replaced by actions in "an open, 
non-opportunistic and declared" manner (Politics 153). The 
revolutionary nature of the struggle is also a factor in the 
necessity of recruiting and keeping members of the movement. 
I t  is far too easy for nationalists in the 6 counties to 
resort to pessimism and apathy; a membership closely involved 
in policy decisions encourages continued support  and
involvement.
In The Politics o f Irish  Freedom Gerry Adams makes a
direct and eloquent statement of modern Irish Republicanism. 
He argues that the violent and discriminatory nature of both 
the 6 county state and its British rulers make i t  impossible 
to reform, and that only after Britain withdraws can the
sectarian scars begin to heal. Armed struggle is a tactic of 
the Republican movement that should serve political ends.
Adams has concentrated on developing Sinn Fein into a 
relevant party for the entire 32 counties, instituting a 
system of political education and moulding the party's
leadership into a collective one. He makes clear, however, 
that there is a long road ahead for Sinn Fein to become a
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"mass organiser of the Irish people" (Politics 164) . He 
concludes the book with a brief analysis of the prospects for 
peace in Ireland, prospects that he calls "hopeful," and which 
he further details in A Pathway to Peace.
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Chapter IV
Republican Strategist for Peace and Justice:
A Pathway to Peace
As Gerry Adams emphasized in The Politics o f  Irish
Freedom. Republicans desire the formation of a new democratic 
society in a united Ireland, and they recognize that the just 
society cannot be brought about by armed conflict. As he 
stated in The Politics of Irish Freedom. "One cannot shoot or 
bomb an independent Ireland into existence" (64). Adams
acknowledges the necessity for a political strategy to achieve 
the goal of national independence and freedom. A Pathway to
Peace, published in 1988, offers a democratic plan that does 
not rely on, nor require any support of, the armed struggle. 
Republicans, instead of being "mindless terrorists," a
stereotype even the British Army leadership knows to be
false1, are serious political persons who seek a just and 
peaceful society for a ll sections of the Irish people, 
regardless of political or religious affiliation. Adams 
repeatedly asserts the necessity to protect the rights of 
unionists in the constitution of a united Ireland and stresses 
that Republicans wish to include Protestants, not exclude 
them, in the future Ireland. In contrast to the propaganda 
that labels Adams a hooligan and fanatical terrorist, A
1British Army Brigadier J.M. Glover reported that I.R.A. 
members were not "merely mindless hooligans drawn from the 
unemployed and unemployable," were not Marxist, and did not 
target civilians. His report also concluded that they would 
continue to fight until the British withdraw from the six 
counties (Cronin 342, 340, 348, 356).
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Pathway to Peace proves that Adams not only would prefer an 
alternative to the armed struggle but that he has offered a 
valid and realistic plan to achieve what a ll parties claim to 
desire: justice and peace in a democratic society.
His proposed solution, Adams admits, is "shaped by my 
politics," just as his critics' views are shaped by theirs 
(Pathway 8). The solution offered by constitutional 
nationalists and the British government, as represented by the 
1985 Hillsborough Treaty (also known as the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty), is inadequate because i t  denies the Irish people's 
right of national self-determination by perpetuating and 
guaranteeing the British colonial hold on six counties of 
Ireland (Pathway 30, 34). The issue of fu ll national self- 
determination is a requirement for freedom, Adams claims, and 
is, therefore, not subject to compromise. For this reason, 
this book does not propose a particular form of government; i t  
argues instead "only for the right to national self- 
determination" (Pathway 8).
National self-determination is an idea that has a long 
history in the Irish Republican movement, deriving from its 
"Father" Theobald Wolfe Tone and reaffirmed in the 1916 
Proclamation (Pathway 40, 7). Because national self- 
determination is
a nation’s right to exercise the political freedom 
to determine its own social, economic and cultural 
development without external influence and without 
partial or total disruption of the national unity or 
territoria l integrity (Pathway 27),
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Ireland cannot exercise this right while part of its territory 
is occupied by a foreign power. This right, an internationally 
recognized principle, cannot be denied by partition, according 
to the United Nations (Pathway 86, 87). But because of 
partition, Britain not only directly controls part of Ireland, 
but indirectly controls the 26 counties as well through 
powerful economic and political influence (Pathway 7). The 
Republic, a neo-colony, Adams argues, may have the symbols of 
freedom, but the "essence of freedom is s t i l l  denied us" 
(Pathway 32, 9). Ireland cannot exercise this fundamental 
right of national self-determination because i t  is denied, 
primarily by partition, the means of doing so.
Given that partition is the source and sole obstacle to 
the exercise of this indisputable right, i t  necessarily must 
be ended. "That should be the single greatest priority of all 
progressive elements in Ireland and the primary task of the 
Dublin government," Adams declares. "That this is not the case 
is a national disgrace" (Pathway 10).
The Hillsborough Treaty provides the most convincing 
evidence of the lack of commitment by the Republic to the 
principle of national self-determination. Though its 
constitution "claims territorial sovereignty" of the entire 
island, the Republic's leaders chose to sign a document that 
"formally recognises the loyalist veto," and, by extension, 
British subversion of national sovereignty (Pathway 67, 14). 
Even more distressing is the role proscribed by the Treaty 
that Dublin is to take in the maintenance of partition.
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Through cross-border security cooperation, the establishment 
of an Inter-governmental Conference, and the classification of 
the Dublin government as the official representative of the 
nationalist community of the six counties, the Treaty makes 
Dublin a "junior partner" in the maintenance of partition 
(Pathway 15, 16; Politics 106) . As a result, Irish taxpayers 
contribute more per capita than do their British counterparts 
for the maintenance of the border (Pathway 35).
In order to understand how the British would consider 
allowing Dublin a say in the affairs of the six counties, a 
notion to which the Unionists were predictably opposed and the 
primary reason for violent loyalist opposition to the treaty 
as a whole, the Hillsborough Treaty must be viewed in light of 
the events prior to its creation. From 1982 to 1986, Sinn Fein 
garnered from 35% to 42.6% of the nationalist vote in the six 
counties (Politics x i i ) . This shift in electoral politics, 
coupled with increased community support for Republicans 
following the hunger strikes and expanded I.R.A. activity in 
both the six counties and England, threatened both the 
constitutional nationalists2 and the stability of the 
statelet. Hillsborough provided a means by which British 
strategies to maintain partition, decrease Republican support, 
and stabilize the six counties could be enacted (Politics 
105) .
2The term “constitutional nationalist" resurfaced at this 
time in the SDLP's effort to regain electoral support by 
giving rhetorical endorsement of nationalism (Pathway 52).
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The Treaty's primary backers, the constitutional
nationalists, represented by the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP), and the Dublin government, publicly applauded i t
as a means to alleviate the "alienation of northern
nationalists" (Pathway 19). But, Adams argues, the real
objective of the Treaty is to stabilize British interests and
is clear in its own preamble that declared its commitment
to a society in Northern Ireland in which a ll may 
live in peace, free from discrimination and 
intolerance, and with the opportunity for both 
communities to participate fully in the structuring 
and processing of governments (Pathway 14).
Contrary to the Dublin government's and the SDLP's
predictions, Adams' assessment three years after its
ratification shows the Treaty did not accomplish the goals
claimed by the Irish delegation.
- No change has occurred in the R.U.C.'s operation: 
torture and harassment of the nationalist community has 
continued;
- The U.D.R. has not been disbanded;
- Paid-perjurer testimony, known as super-grass, was not 
halted by the Treaty but instead by international 
pressure;
- The shoot-to-kill policy, revealed by the Stalker 
inquiry, continues,
- Cultural repression, such as the ban on Irish in the 
prisons, s t i l l  exists;
- Religious discrimination in employment in the six 
counties continues;
- Republican prisoners are s t i l l  mistreated;
- Promised U.S. investment in support of the Treaty 
failed to appear;
- Plastic bullets are s t i l l  used by the R.U.C. and the 
British army; and
- Censorship by the Republic aimed at Sinn Fein was 
imposed after the Treaty (Pathway 19-21) .
For John Stalker's own story of his investigation in the 
shoot-to-kill policy, see The Stalker Affair (Viking Penguin: 
New York, NY, 1988) .
81
For the British, however, the Treaty was "an unmitigated 
success" because i t  accomplished British objectives: 
insulation from international criticism of its colonial role 
in Northern Ireland and "increased and harmonized repressive 
measures . . . with unprecedented collaboration by Dublin with 
the British regime" (Pathway 25). Though the six counties are 
not stabilized, the Hillsborough Treaty has given Britain 
increased propaganda capacity to portray itse lf as the 
unbiased third-party protector of democracy and stability. The 
Dublin government, on the other hand, "formally relinquished 
its de jure claim to represent a ll Irish people, accepting in 
return . . .  a facility  whereby i t  could air its views of the 
grievances of nationalists in the six counties" (Pathway 35). 
Given such a situation, with the Republic accepting partition 
in exchange for a limited say in the affairs of the six 
counties, the nationalist community of the statelet clearly 
was betrayed by those now claiming to be their sole 
representatives. In A Pathway to Peace. Adams attempts to 
outline a plan for peace that represents the nationalist 
community's interests, which can only be served in the context 
of a united Ireland.
The Hillsborough Treaty represents a firs t phase in the 
SDLP's "low-risk" approach to resolving the conflict and 
removing partition, a strategy Adams reveals as ineffective. 
The constitutional nationalists, of which the SDLP represents 
the majority in Northern Ireland, believe a gradual and phased 
removal of partition is in the best interests of the
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nationalist community of the six counties. The Treaty, the 
SDLP argues, w ill encourage increased communication between 
the Dublin and London governments, resulting in a merger of 
strategies, eventual easing of sectarian tensions, and finally 
Irish re-unification (Pathway 29-30) . This approach, Adams 
claims, denies both the long history of the colonial 
relationship of Britain and Ireland and British interests in 
the continued partitioned statelet.
The "low-risk" strategy demands that "Irish re­
unification can only come about either by 'consent' or with 
the 'agreement' of the unionists." As Adams points out, 
proponents of this approach neglect to define what "unity by 
consent" means: a simple majority of the entire electorate of 
the six counties, a simple majority of the unionist or 
Protestant electorate, a higher percentage of unionist 
agreement (70%, 90% or 100%), or a six-county population with 
a nationalist majority (Pathway 43). Though Adams argues that 
i t  is almost impossible for nationalists to achieve a majority 
in the statelet, C-Span reported on August 29, 1992 that 
Catholics constituted 40% of the population in Northern 
Ireland. Assuming the rate of expatriation does not increase 
and there is an absence of genocide and deadly diseases that 
discriminate against Catholics, the Catholic community could 
occupy the majority position in the statelet in the next few 
decades. Re-partition, which has been demanded by some 
elements in the loyalist community, would then be necessary in 
order to obtain the original Protestant numerical majority. It
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would be extraordinarily d ifficu lt for Britain, while 
contending that i t  is a neutral third-party consenting to the 
w ill of the majority, to re-draw the border of Northern 
Ireland to protect unionist interests.
Adams does agree, however, with the SDLP's assertion that 
the loyalists' interests are actually best served by 
participation in the establishment of a united Ireland. He 
quotes Jack Bennett to argue that because of the colonial 
nature of the statelet, no citizen has real political power 
within that context.
The six county political system denies the right of 
democratic choice on fundamental matters even to the 
'democratic majority' within i t .  All major decisions 
affecting their well-being, their future and their 
status are taken virtually without reference to 
them. . . . All argument which is based on a 
reference to the 'wishes of the democratic majority' 
in the six counties is, therefore, based on a false 
premise, since i t  takes a stand in defence of 
something which they do not have anyway (Pathway 45- 
46) .
Furthermore, Adams argues, partition was not agreed upon by 
the Irish people. To maintain, as the Hillsborough Treaty 
does, that the majority in Northern Ireland want to retain 
partition is not only an assumption, but an invalid argument. 
There have been no referendums since partition was imposed to 
determine what the majority really wants. Partition was not a 
democratic choice; instead, Sinn Fein asserts in its document 
A Scenario for Peace,
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, the partition of 
Ireland and the Constitution of the Irish Free State 
were imposed on the Irish people under the threat of 
immediate and terrible war. They were not submitted 
to the Irish people for ratification and their
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imposition represents a denial to the Irish people 
of the freedom to exercise their right to self- 
determination (Pathway 85).
The election of 1918, the document also states, was the last 
time the w ill of the Irish people was heard. Sinn Fein ran on 
the single issue of complete Irish independence, and i t  won 
with 69.5% of the vote (Pathway 85).
Adams, again using Bennett's words, contends that the 
argument supporting the loyalist veto that is based merely on 
"mechanistic democratic logic" is invalid because i t  "gets 
itse lf tied up in knots, basically because the problem is 
falsely presented from the start and because the real nature 
of the problem is over-looked" (Pathway 47) . Northern Ireland 
is a gerrymandered statelet, and the real problem is how to 
get Britain to withdraw and end partition.
Even i f  the constitutional nationalists agreed on the 
definition of "unity by consent" and agreement of the 
unionists, Adams asserts that persuading the unionists that 
their interests are best served in the context of a united 
Ireland, which w ill not be a Protestant state for a Protestant 
people, defies logic and "ignores the reality of political 
power" (Pathway 57). Constitutional nationalists wrongly
believe that political power "resides in parliamentary 
institutions," while the real "essence" of political power, 
Adams asserts, is "economic and social power" (Pathway 56, 
57). As long as Britain upholds the loyalist veto, unionists 
w ill not unilaterally and willingly break the link with 
Britain because they perceive their economic and social
85
interests are best protected by the maintenance of that link 
(Pathway 57, 59). Ironically, the Hillsborough Treaty exposes 
the constitutional nationalists' lack of faith in their own 
argument. "They depend on the London and Dublin governments," 
Adams argues "to back their political project with at least 
the implicit threat of the use of state force against the 
weaker sectional interests of six county unionism" (Pathway 
58) .
Ultimately, however, the "low-risk" strategy and its 
reliance upon the consent of the unionists, Adams contends, is 
"an excuse for political paralysis in tackling the core 
problem" (Pathway 43). By accepting the loyalist veto and 
partition, this strategy and its proponents, the 
constitutional nationalists, deny the Irish people their right 
to national self-determination. The constitutional 
nationalists have become, Adams concludes, apologists for 
British partition and British colonial interests (Pathway 44).
Because freedom involves more than suffrage, and " it is 
the right to fulfillment, the right to equality, the right to 
meaningful employment, the right not to be forced to emigrate, 
the right not to be poor," the constitutional nationalists' 
approach, exemplified in the Hillsborough Treaty, cannot 
guarantee freedom for the Irish people because i t  denies them 
the right of national self-determination (Pathway 9). Peace, 
Adams adds, is more than the absence of war. "It is the 
existence of conditions of justice and equality which 
eradicate the causes of war or conflict" (Pathway 26). Thus,
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for the same reason - the rejection of national self- 
determination - their approach fails to deliver or guarantee 
peace.
Adams offers, primarily to the constitutional 
nationalists, a strategy that delivers on the promise of 
peace, justice, and freedom by building on the right to 
national independence and self-determination. "A Strategy for 
Irish Constitutionalists" outlines the aims, needs, and basic 
program for a plan which Sinn Fein proposed during the 1988 
Sinn Fein/SDLP talks. This strategy, based on the party's 
document A Scenario for Peace. Adams felt, would be agreeable 
to the SDLP leadership (Pathway 64).
The primary aim of any plan to obtain peace in Ireland 
must be based on the premise of the right to national self- 
determination and the fact that Britain's partition has denied 
that right to the Irish people. An effort to "secure maximum 
national and international political and popular support for a 
commitment" to this stated principle is a requirement (Pathway 
64).
There are two immediate needs of this strategy. First, 
the British government must be convinced that partition should 
be ended so that the Irish people can democratically choose 
their all-Ireland government. Second, unionists must also be 
persuaded that "their future lies in this context," and the 
British must be encouraged to help convince them. A national 
consensus on and commitment to ending partition by all Irish
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political parties is also needed to influence the unionist 
community (Pathway 65).
The plan should include efforts to obtain international
support and commitment through diplomatic means; support by
Irish expatriates and their descendants, specifically those in
the United States, Britain, and Australia; both political and
popular support in Britain; influence in international forums;
and the initiating of a dialogue with northern Protestants
(Pathway 65). This plan must necessarily
assure [Protestants] of fu ll commitment to their 
c iv il and religious rights and to persuade them of 
the need for their participation in building an 
Irish society based on equality and national 
reconciliation (Pathway 66).
As Adams has argued in other works, Republicans, by calling 
for the British to withdraw, do not call "for the forced 
banishment of those in the north who presently consider 
themselves to be British subjects." They are necessary for a 
peaceful and just nation and can contribute to the 
establishment of the new society and its government. A 
Scenario for Peace repeats this argument in its call for 
loyalist participation in its proposed all-Ireland 
Constitutional Conference:
Republicans have consistently asserted that the 
loyalist people in common with a ll other citizens, 
must be given firm guarantees of their religious and 
c iv il liberties and we repeat our belief that, faced 
with a British withdrawal and the removal of 
partition, a considerable body of loyalist opinion 
would accept the wisdom of negotiating for the type 
of society which would reflect their needs and 
interests (Pathway 91).
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Finally, this proposed strategy calls for a program
involving a national and international campaign to mobilize
support for these principles and goals. An effort would be
made to try to garner British popular support also. The
"defence of democratic rights and social and economic rights" 
must also be an aim for national and international political 
action, and a democratic organizational structure should be
established to oversee implementation of this program (Pathway 
6 6 ) .
The primary thread running through the Sinn Fein proposal 
to the SDLP leadership is popular support for national
independence and re-unification. Adams argues that the British 
consider Irish re-unification a "passive political aim" 
because the leaderships of most nationalist parties have
failed to demand i t  seriously (Pathway 67-68) . I f  the
leadership does not take this demand seriously, the community 
cannot be expected to rally in support of i t .  For instance, 
the New Ireland Forum's report, which listed three options for 
resolution of the Irish question, promoted Irish re­
unification as the preferred solution. Yet, when then British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher dismissed a ll three in her 
famous "Out, out, out" remark, the Irish leaders who 
formulated the report failed to defend it ,  "expos[ing] the 
lack of substance behind the paper positions of the 
establishment parties in Ireland" (Pathway 67).
The Irish parties' leaderships, therefore, have thus far 
failed in their responsibility to place national independence
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and re-unification as a top priority and provide the necessary 
“political guidance on how to achieve that objective" (Pathway 
69). Adams calls on the leaderships to remedy this situation 
and achieve "maximum political unity in Ireland, based on the 
principle of national self-determination" by calling on the 
Dublin and London governments to agree publicly to talks on 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Though i t  is 
unlikely that the British government would publicly proclaim 
the intention to withdraw, Adams maintains, i f  the Dublin 
government, persuaded and backed by the leaderships of the 
nationalists parties, were to request talks with London on 
withdrawal, the British government's proclaimed neutral 
position would be seen as a propaganda cover designed to 
thwart responsibility. A refusal by the British most likely 
would result in international support for the Irish cause 
(Pathway 70-71). The SDLP's rejection of this proposal, Adams 
asserts, "shows how l i t t le  real interest the SDLP leadership 
have in developing a realistic strategy for re-unification"
(Pathway 76) . For Adams, support for armed struggle is not 
required either for this movement or for a nationalist. 
However, i t  is clear that dedication to the principle of 
national independence and self-determination is a prerequisite 
for nationalist leaders, and he challenges constitutional 
nationalists to exhibit this dedication.
It  is Sinn Fein's contention that a required step toward 
re-unification includes an alliance of a ll the Irish political 
parties who call themselves "nationalist" and a debate among
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them on the major issues involved. This proposed course is a 
logical extension of Adams' theory expounded in his writings 
of the critical need for political education for the activist 
and the community. Without such discussion that leads to 
understanding, the community cannot support fully the 
activists' policies. "The battle for ideas," Adams declares 
"is one which must be contested vigorously" (Pathway 76).
Furthermore, this community support must be developed 
into an all-Ireland mass movement centered on the aim of Irish 
national self-determination. The movement must be open and 
democratic, and its demands should be "social, economic and 
cultural as well as political" (Pathway 77). Such demands 
include women's rights, Irish neutrality, environmental 
protection, and the ending of sectarianism, discrimination, 
forced emigration, and, of course, British occupation (Pathway 
81). Adams proposes that this movement adopt a charter, 
similar to the Freedom Charter of the African National 
Congress, that would constitute the basis for the demands and 
policies of the movement (Pathway 80). Though attempts to 
forge such a movement have failed in the past, Adams asserts 
that efforts must begin now and should be led by Republicans 
and socialists (Pathway 78).
Adams acknowledges that these proposals are not ironclad, 
and he welcomes debate on the issues. But there are principles 
upon which compromise is impossible because they are 
fundamental rights and necessary for a peaceful and just 
society.
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The ending of partition, a British disengagement 
from Ireland and the restoration to the Irish people 
of the right to exercise self-sovereignty, 
independence and national self-determination remain 
the only solution to the British colonial conflict 
in Ireland (Pathway 89).
Though the SDLP agreed to these principles in its 1988 talks 
with Sinn Fein, they have yet to offer any real strategy to 
achieve them. On the other hand, Sinn Fein, Adams argues, has 
offered a non-violent strategy based on national self- 
determination that calls for a mass movement to bring about 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. It  has called for an 
all-Ireland Constitutional Conference for the development of a 
new constitution for a united Ireland, emphasizing the need to 
include loyalists in the establishment of the new society and 
ensure their rights in i t .
By presenting these proposals, and the basis upon which 
they were developed, Adams hopes to encourage debate. This 
book, like the others before it ,  belies the stereotype that 
Republicans are mindless terrorists and proves Adams and his 
writings worthy of serious consideration.
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that Gerry Adams has played a major 
role in the modern Irish Republican movement, specifically in 
the last decade. In reality, he is a founder of a new 
political party because i t  was only in 1974 that Sinn Fein 
became legal in the six counties. Prior to Adams' leadership, 
the party totally ignored and neglected the 26 counties and 
le ft a nationalist vacuum in both North and South that was 
partially filled  by The Workers Party in the South and the 
SDLP in the North. Adams' political ideas are at once new and 
old; he has combined all five of Cronin's strands of Irish 
nationalism to form a modern Irish Republicanism that w ill 
last into the 21st century.
The four books discussed in this study provide a complete 
foundation for analysis of Adams' political development and 
beliefs. Falls Memories and Cage Eleven trace his childhood 
and early years in the Republican movement, interpreting the 
history of British rule of Ireland and the partitioned 
statelet in which he was born. From that history and personal 
experience, he came to the conclusion that the British must 
withdraw from the six counties and that force, or the threat 
of force, is the only method to which Britain w ill respond. 
The c iv il rights movement of the late 1960s reinforced his 
belief that the Northern Ireland statelet was inherently 
unjust and could not be reformed; a united Ireland was a 
realistic goal that offered the only hope of ending the
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conflict with justice. His experiences as a political prisoner 
in the British ja il Long Kesh (the Maze) provided the basis 
upon which he would draw educational, political, and electoral 
lessons. Upon release, Adams' stature in the Republican 
movement rose as he encouraged electoral intervention, 
increased community support, and eloquently defended his 
political ideas.
The 1969/70 split in the Republican movement taught Adams 
that the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater: a 
definite political strategy was needed to lead the movement in 
the modern political era and the armed struggle was only a 
part of that larger strategy. Both Cage Eleven and The 
Politics of Irish Freedom emphasize that the armed struggle, 
while important in the overall strategy, is clearly 
subordinate to the political struggle. This is a radical 
departure from the traditional Republican view prior to the 
1960s, which saw Sinn Fein as a support organization for the 
I.R.A. Even the British have publicly recognized the 
fundamental transformation in the party. Patrick Mayhew, the 
British Northern Ireland Secretary, to the dismay of 
Unionists, stated on December 10, 1992, that the party was not 
"actively and primarily involved in terrorism" and should 
remain legal (Tendler 6). Nevertheless, the British 
government, bowing to Unionist pressure, continues to refuse 
to allow Sinn Fein to take part in any public discussions on 
Northern Ireland.
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The___Politics of Irish Freedom is Gerry Adams' most
complex political work and, combined with A Pathway to Peace, 
portrays Adams as a broad-minded political thinker, not a 
stereotypical violent radical. He presents his analysis of the 
history of the Troubles since 1969, the role of the 
Republicans and the constitutional nationalists, and his 
vision of a solution to the conflict. Adams' emphasis on anti­
sectarianism, the fundamental right of the Irish to govern 
themselves, and the necessity of armed struggle to bring about 
a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland arises directly 
from Tone's United Irishmen. Cultural nationalism is a central 
force in Adams' Republicanism, and he denies the fairly recent 
claim by Protestants that they are not Irish. Though the 
Protestant Ascendancy must be crushed in order for a just 
society to be born, Protestants themselves need not be.
'Brits Out' is not a call, as is often mischievously 
suggested, for the forced banishment of those in the 
north who presently consider themselves to be 
British subjects. On the contrary we need them 
because a peaceful, just and united society in 
Ireland must include them and because the Protestant 
• working class are our brothers and sisters. We do 
not seek to exclude them (Pathway 11).
Disregarding this fact, Mayhew warned the Protestant community
that Serbian-type "ethnic cleansing" of Protestants, not of
Catholics as most analysts have long feared, might result i f
British troops were to withdraw (Tendler & Victor 1).
Gerry Adams has continued to call for informed debate and
political talks. Since the Sinn Fein/SDLP talks in 1988, Adams
has publicly debated the SDLP's leader, John Hume, in 1992,
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and Sinn Fein recently issued a manifesto calling for peace 
talks with the British and all political parties involved 
(Gorman, "Adams" 11; London Times "Irish Peace Call" 10). 
Adams has declared consistently that a negotiated peace cannot 
come about without participation from Republicans, and he 
reiterated this point in his debate with Hume. An "inclusive 
dialogue," he argued, was necessary and demanded by his 
party's mandate in elections.
Sinn Fein's involvement in electoral politics has been 
another dramatic shift in the party's strategies. Though not 
new to electoral contests, Sinn Fein rarely involved itse lf in 
electoral intervention (partly because the party was banned in 
Northern Ireland until 1974). Adams admits that the electoral 
successes, most notably in the hunger strike era, "have played 
a major role in changing the nature of Sinn Fein" (Politics 
151). Adams was also a key player in the 1986 reversal of the 
abstentionist policy to Leinster House. Ken Livingstone 
acknowledges the importance of leadership to Sinn Fein's 
electoral strategy:
The leadership of Sinn Fein needed a real degree of 
confidence to start to adopt their electoral 
strategy given the tradition of orthodox 
republicanism and the background of Sinn Fein. It 
was a very high risk (19).
Adams lost his West Belfast seat in Parliament (which he 
never took, but which provided him with greater access to the 
international and British media) to the SDLP candidate, Dr. 
Joe Hendron. Though some have claimed that his defeat proves 
Sinn Fein's electoral strategy has failed (London Times
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"Ballot box" 3), his defeat by only 589 votes on the third 
attempt surely fails to offer conclusive proof, and Adams had 
predicted that press restrictions, such as Section 31 of the 
Republic's Broadcasting Act, and continued loyalist attacks on 
Sinn Fein workers might hurt in their electoral efforts. 
Furthermore, Protestants on the Shankill Road were reported to 
have voted tactically for the SDLP candidate in order to oust 
Adams. Adams vote total was 16,826, a drop of only 3 6 votes 
from his last election. A Sinn Fein spokesperson predictably 
declared that the SDLP had only "borrowed" the seat, and the 
party would win i t  back at the firs t opportunity (Gorman, 
"Tactical voting" 7) .
Clearly, Sinn Fein has not abandoned its policy toward 
establishing an electoral strategy. Though the I.R.A. may 
indeed have stepped up its bombing campaign due to the lack of 
movement toward British withdrawal (and the increased attacks 
on Catholic citizens1), i t  is unlikely that Sinn Fein w ill 
alter its electoral stance. Success in the electoral arena 
brings about a legitimacy for the Republican movement that the 
party's leadership desperately seeks. Though U.S. President 
B ill Clinton made a campaign pledge to allow Adams to vis it 
the country on a fundraising tour, "a move that the British 
government," James Adams in the London Times declares, "has
1Loyalist paramilitary groups, like the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (U.V.F.), the Ulster Defence Association (U.D.A.) and 
the Ulster Freedom Fighters (U.F.F.), killed more people in 
1992 than the I.R.A. , and they may outnumber a ll Republican 
paramilitary groups (Ford 1).
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successfully opposed for years" (1), Adams' parliamentary 
defeat may give Clinton an excuse to back down under British 
and Unionist pressure, just as he did on the issue of a 
special envoy to Northern Ireland. Another Clinton reversal on 
the issue of Northern Ireland would deal a harsh blow to Sinn 
Fein's efforts for expanding international support, the kind 
of support and media attention that served the African 
National Congress quite well.
Gerry Adams would be the firs t to disagree with the
statement that he is responsible for the Irish Republican
movement's political maturation in the last decade. He has
made great pains to eliminate the "cult of personality which
exists in Irish public life" (Politics 154). His "collective
leadership" is intended to take the spotlight off the
political leader and place i t  instead on the political
membership. In so doing, the party members take on more
responsibility for policy decisions, become better informed
and educated about the issues, and pass that knowledge on to
their constituents, the nationalist community. All these
efforts combine to increase popular support. Again, Ken
Livingstone succinctly describes the effect of collective
leadership on the movement:
If  you have popular support, you don't need to shout 
that loudly; people w ill listen. I t  is also an 
awareness that things can't be achieved by
individuals, and that is a lesson for us a ll. . . .
You have got to have that popular support. I think 
that is clearly a lot of the thinking that has gone 
on in Sinn Fein over the last few years; there has 
been as much a change in style as in policies of the 
leadership. They have that confidence that wider
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support creates, and confidence is a key part of 
political leadership (18-19).
Gerry Adams has built for the Irish Republican movement a 
leadership and a political party that w ill serve Republicans 
well into the next decade and beyond. Adams' political 
theories have irreversibly altered the direction of the 
movement, much like the ideas of his Republican predecessors. 
The four works discussed in this study belie the stereotype of 
Irish Republican leaders as mindless terrorists. A selection 
from The Politics of Irish Freedom, is included in the Field 
Day Anthology of Irish Writing. Vol. I l l  (pp. 796-803), 
published in 1991. This inclusion of his writings confirms 
Gerry Adams as a serious political leader, in the same 
category as Padraig Pearse, James Connolly, and John Mitchel, 
a ll once considered terrorists and now recognized as great 
leaders of their eras.
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1170 Ireland's firs t invasion by Anglo forces.
1366 Statutes of Kilkenny, repressive acts against native 
Irish, enacted. They prevented intermarriage between 
native Irish and English, prohibited the speaking of 
Irish Gaelic, prohibited the colonizers from adopting 
any aspect of the native Irish culture, and The Pale, 
area around Dublin where Irish were prohibited, was 
established.
1598 - 1607
O'Neill/O'Donnel Ulster Rebellion; plantation of Ulster 
province begins after "Flight of Earls" out of Ireland 
in 1607.
1641 Irish uprising is defeated.
1690 James II  defeated by William of Orange at Battle of 
Boyne. The Twelfth of July becomes a traditional 
holiday for the northern protestant community to 
celebrate the occasion by demonstrations and bonfires.
1691 Treaty of Limerick between William's forces and Patrick 
Sarsfield for Irish army signed; i t  guaranteed no 
discrimination or persecution of Catholics. The treaty 
was never enacted, and Catholicism and Presbyterianism 
were banned.
1695 First of the Penal Laws enacted. These laws, which
remained in force for 40 years, discriminated against 
Irish Catholics and aided the seizure of Catholic-owned 
land.
1780 Grattan's Parliament established.
1791 United Irishmen founded by Theobald Wolfe Tone in 
Belfast.
1795 Orange Order founded during Catholic and Protestant 
skirmishes over land. I t  was revived in the 1880s to 
defeat Home Rule.
1798 United Irishmen's Uprising failed and Tone commits 
suicide to avoid his execution by the British.
1800 Westminster Parliament enacted Act of Union,
establishing the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland.
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1803 Robert Emmet's uprising failed.
1847 Beginning of Great Famine.
1848 Young Ireland rising crushed.
1867 Fenian rising failed.
1905 Sinn Fein founded.
1916 Easter Rising ended with Connolly's and Pearse's 
executions.
1918 Sinn Fein election victory in Westminster elections. 
Victors refused to sit at Westminster and formed the 
First Dail in January 1919.
1919 I.R.A. founded and launched war for an Irish Republic 
based on the 1916 Proclamation.
1920 Government of Ireland act passed by Westminster.
1921 Truce in Black and Tan War begun in 1917.
1922 Second Dail ratified the Treaty and c iv il war began.
1923 I.R.A. unilateral cease-fire ended the Civil War.
1926 Fianna Fail founded by Eamon de Valera when he left
Sinn Fein.
1939 I.R.A. began its firs t major bombing campaign on 
English soil.
1956 I.R.A. began the border campaign that was to last until 
1962 .
1968 Civil rights marchers in Derry attacked by the R.U.C. 
on October 5.
1969 The Falls area is invaded by loyalists and the R.U.C. 
The Battle of the Bogside waged and British troops were 
deployed in the six counties.
1970 Sinn Fein split into Official and Provisional wings.
The Provisional I.R.A. called upon by Republican 
activists to defend the Catholic community.
1971 Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner 
introduced internment without tr ia l.
1972 On January 30, 13 unarmed marchers were killed and 29 
wounded by British troops on “Bloody Sunday." In March, 
the Stormont government fe ll.
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1974 The Irish Republican Socialist Party (I.R.S.P.) formed 
from a split in Official Sinn Fein.
1976 "Criminisation" and "Ulsterisation" policies began.
Peace People formed primarily by the sister of Anne 
Maguire, the woman who was killed when I.R.A. volunteer 
Danny Lennon's car crashed into her and her children 
after he was shot and killed by British troops.
1978 Glover report on I.R.A. written.
1980 H-Block hunger strike for political status begun in 
October and ended in December.
1981 Bobby Sands began the second hunger strike in March, 
was elected M.P. in a by-election in April, and died in 
May. Nine more prisoners died before the strike was 
ended in October.
1983 Gerry Adams elected president of Sinn Fein and won the 
Westminster M.P. seat for West Belfast, but refused to 
take it ,  following the abstentionist policy of the 
Republican movement.
1986 Sinn Fein ended abstentionist policy toward Leinster 
House, Dublin's parliament.
1988 Secret Sinn Fein/SDLP talks held.
1992 Adams is defeated by the SDLP candidate for his 
Westminster seat by 582 votes. Loyalist paramilitaries 
increased attacks on Catholic citizens and Sinn Fein 
and SDLP candidates, killing more people in the year 
than the I.R.A. killed.
1993 I.R.A. steps up its bombing campaign in England. Peace 
Initiative '93 is formed in response to death of an 
English child by an I.R.A. bomb in Warrington. Sinn 
Fein predicts its failure due to its one-sided 




B Specials: A part-time branch of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary. The A, B, and C Specials were established at the 
time of partition. The B Specials were the last unit to be 
disbanded, and they were replaced by the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (U.D.R.).
Dai l  Eireann: The firs t Dail Eireann, or parliament of 
Ireland, was set up in January 1919 by the Sinn Fein 
candidates who won in the 1918 Westminster general election. 
The Second Dail was established by the May 1921 parliamentary 
election held under the provisions of the Government of 
Ireland Act (1920). Sinn Fein won 124 of 128 seats in the 
Dublin parliament, while the Unionist Party won 40 of 52 seats 
in the North's parliament (Kelley 42).
James Connolly: Socialist leader who founded the Irish 
Socialist Republican Party in 1896, he was a labor activist 
and took part in the 1916 Rising and shot on May 12 1916 for 
his leadership of i t .
Easter 1916 Rising: Led by James Connolly and Padraig Pearse, 
this rising took place on Easter Monday, 1916. The 
Proclamation was read at the General Post Office in Dublin, 
and its leaders and their followers in the Irish Citizen Army 
and Irish Volunteers fought for a week. All seven leaders of 
the rising were executed by the British.
Fianna Fail: Founded by Eamon de Valera in 1926, this party 
continues to remain one of the two main parties in the 26 
counties. Its name means "Soldiers of Destiny."
Irish Parliamentary Party (I.P.P.): Main party promoting Home 
Rule in the 19th century, the party's most famous leaders were 
Charles Stuart Parnell and John Redmond.
Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.): First known as the 
Fenians, this secret organization had as its aim national 
independence. I t  became known as the I.R.B. in 1873 and is 
credited with planning the Easter 1916 Rising.
John Mitchel: One of the founders of the Young Ireland 
movement that led the 1848 Rising.
New Ireland Forum: The government of the Irish Republic in 
1983 called together all constitutional nationalist parties, 
excluding Sinn Fein, to gather together and consider methods 
for reunification. Its report, issued in 1984, promoted three 
possible solutions: a unitary state, a thirty-two county
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Ireland, and a federal or confederal arrangement. The Forum's 
preference was a thirty-two county Ireland. British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher dismissed a ll three options in her 
infamous "Out! Out! Out!" remark in 1984.
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA): Founded in 
1967 by the Campaign for Social Justice, Republicans, and 
other groups, the organization is most noted for its role in 
the non-violent Northern Ireland c iv il rights movement of the 
late 1960s.
Orange Order: Formed in 1795 during the Catholic and 
Protestant land skirmishes, no Catholic nor anyone with a 
close relative who is Catholic may be a member of the 
organization. In the 1880s i t  was revived to defeat Home Rule. 
The Unionist Party was formed from the Orange Order.
Ian Paisley: Loyalist minister who founded the Free 
Presbyterian Church in 1951, he is an active Unionist 
politician in the six counties and has been M.P. for North 
Antrim since 1970. He founded the Democratic Unionist Party in 
1971.
Padraig (Patrick) Pearse: Writer of the 1916 Proclamation, he 
was executed for his leadership of the Rising. He was 
President of the Provisional Government that was set up by the 
leaders of the Rising.
Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.): The R.U.C. was modeled 
after the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.), the police force 
of Ireland until 1922. The R.U.C. became the police force for 
Northern Ireland after partition. Half of its members were 
R.I.C. members, while the other half were originally Ulster 
Volunteer Force (U.V.F.) members that became the Special 
Constabulary. The U.V.F. was a Unionist paramilitary group 
founded in 1913 to fight against Home Rule, and was revived in 
1966 by a loyalist paramilitary organization. Though 
originally designed to have a composition of two-thirds 
Protestants and one-third Catholics, the R.U.C. is about 90 
percent Protestant (Farrell 54, 359). The R.U.C. has been 
blamed for participation in repression of the nationalist 
community in the six counties since the its creation.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): Headed by John 
Hume, the party calling itse lf constitutional nationalist 
opposes the armed struggle. Established in 1970, the SDLP 
draws its support from the Catholic middle class in the six 
counties.
Special Powers Act (1922): Fully titled the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Act, this act authorized the Minister of Home 
Affairs and the R.U.C. to arrest without warrant, imprison 
without charge, suspend Habeas Corpus, conduct warrant-less 
searches and seizures, declare curfews, prohibit meetings and
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assemblies, deny a tr ia l by jury, arrest and forcibly detain 
suspicious persons, and deny inquests, as well granting a few 
other powers. The South African Minister for Justice said in 
1963 that he "would be willing to exchange a ll the legislation 
of that sort [Coercion Acts] for one clause of the Northern 
Ireland Special Powers Act" (Politics 22).
Ulster Defence Regiment (U.D.R.): Established in 1970, this 
well-armed part-time police force replaced the B Specials and 
consists mostly of Protestants, many of whom are involved in 
Loyalist paramilitary groups.
Ulster Freedom Fighters (U.F.F.): A loyalist paramilitary 
group that targets Catholics and nationalist politicians for 
assassination, the group was reportedly founded in 1973.
Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.): A loyalist paramilitary 
organization established firs t in 1913 to resist Home Rule, i t  
ended in 1923 after the Civil War. In 1966 i t  was revived by a 
loyalist sectarian paramilitary group that continues to target 
Catholics.
Unionism: Unionism, according to Sean Cronin, "is a negative 
concept - a defensive mechanism to maintain the status quo. It 
exists to defend the union with Britain" (34). I t  began as an 
effort to defeat the Home Rule movement in 1886, and used the 
motto "Home Rule is Rome Rule" to garner support from the 
Protestant community. The terms Unionist and Loyalist broadly 
refer to an individual who desires to maintain the union with 




Proclamation of the Irish Republic Easter Monday, 1916
POBLACHT NA H EIREANN.
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
OF THE
IRISH REPUBLIC 
TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND.
IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the 
dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of 
nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her 
flag and strikes for her freedom.
Having organised and trained her manhood through her 
secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the 
Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently 
perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the 
right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, 
and, supported by her exiled children in America and by 
gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own 
strength, she strikes in fu ll confidence of victory.
We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the 
ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish 
destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long 
usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government 
has not extinguished the right, nor can i t  ever be 
extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In 
every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to 
national freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past 
three hundred years they have asserted i t  in arms. Standing on 
that fundamental right and again asserting i t  in arms in the 
face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a 
Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the 
lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of 
its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.
The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the 
allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic 
guarantees religious and c iv il liberty equal rights and equal 
opportunities to a ll its citizens, and declares its resolve to 
pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of 
a ll its parts, cherishing a ll the children of the nation 
equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered 
by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the 
majority in the past.
Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the 
establishment of a permanent National Government, 
representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by 
the suffrages of a ll her men and women, the Provisional
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Government, hereby constituted, w ill administer the c iv il and 
military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.
We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the 
protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon 
our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause w ill 
dishonour i t  by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this 
supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and 
discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice 
themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the 
august destiny to which i t  is called.
Singed on Behalf of the Provisional Government,
THOMAS J. CLARK,
SEAN Mac DIARMADA, THOMAS MacDONAGH,
P. H. PEARSE, EAMONN CEANNT,
JAMES CONNOLLY, JOSEPH PLUNKETT.
